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ABSTRACT	 ﾠ
Findings	 ﾠin	 ﾠbehavioral	 ﾠscience,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠpsychology,	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ
influencing	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠand	 ﾠreforms	 ﾠin	 ﾠmany	 ﾠnations.	 ﾠ“Choice	 ﾠarchitecture”	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠoutcomes	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠmaterial	 ﾠincentives	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠinvolved.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
contexts,	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrules,	 ﾠsimplification,	 ﾠand	 ﾠuses	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ
found	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠeven	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠthan	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠincentives.	 ﾠ
Psychological	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠis	 ﾠhelping	 ﾠto	 ﾠinform	 ﾠinitiatives	 ﾠin	 ﾠareas	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
include	 ﾠsavings,	 ﾠfinance,	 ﾠhighway	 ﾠsafety,	 ﾠconsumer	 ﾠprotection,	 ﾠenergy,	 ﾠ
climate	 ﾠchange,	 ﾠobesity,	 ﾠeducation,	 ﾠpoverty,	 ﾠdevelopment,	 ﾠcrime,	 ﾠ
corruption,	 ﾠhealth,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠenvironment.	 ﾠNo	 ﾠnation	 ﾠhas	 ﾠcreated	 ﾠa	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠPsychological	 ﾠAdvisers,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠbehavioral	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠis	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
grow	 ﾠin	 ﾠcoming	 ﾠyears,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠin	 ﾠlight	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmounting	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
promoting	 ﾠease	 ﾠand	 ﾠsimplification	 ﾠ(“navigability”);	 ﾠin	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠ
effectiveness,	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠgrowth,	 ﾠand	 ﾠcompetitiveness;	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠlow-ﾭ‐cost,	 ﾠ
choice-ﾭ‐preserving	 ﾠapproaches.	 ﾠ(The	 ﾠAppendix	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠone-ﾭ‐page	 ﾠlist	 ﾠof	 ﾠthirty-ﾭ‐
one	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠapproaches.)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
I.	 ﾠINTRODUCTION	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Many	 ﾠnations	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsome	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠof	 ﾠEconomic	 ﾠAdvisers.	 ﾠ
Should	 ﾠthey	 ﾠalso	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠof	 ﾠPsychological	 ﾠAdvisers	 ﾠ(Schwartz	 ﾠ
2012,	 ﾠThaler	 ﾠ2012)?	 ﾠPerhaps	 ﾠthey	 ﾠalready	 ﾠdo.	 ﾠConsider	 ﾠfour	 ﾠinitiatives	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates:	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
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1.  In	 ﾠ 2010,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Federal	 ﾠ Reserve	 ﾠ Board	 ﾠ adopted	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ regulation	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
protect	 ﾠconsumers	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠbank	 ﾠoverdraft	 ﾠfees	 ﾠ(12	 ﾠC.F.R.	 ﾠ§	 ﾠ
205.17;	 ﾠ Fed.	 ﾠ Reserve	 ﾠ System	 ﾠ 2009).	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ regulation	 ﾠ forbids	 ﾠ
banks	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ automatically	 ﾠ enrolling	 ﾠ people	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ “overdraft	 ﾠ
protection”	 ﾠ programs;	 ﾠ instead,	 ﾠ customers	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ sign	 ﾠ up	 ﾠ
(Willis	 ﾠ2013).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠexplaining	 ﾠits	 ﾠaction,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBoard	 ﾠobserved	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
studies	 ﾠhave	 ﾠshown	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“consumers	 ﾠare	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠadhere	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
established	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrule,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoutcome	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠapply	 ﾠif	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠconsumer	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠno	 ﾠaction”	 ﾠ(Fed.	 ﾠReserve	 ﾠSystem	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
Board	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ referred	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ phenomenon	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ unrealistic	 ﾠ
optimism,	 ﾠsuggesting	 ﾠthat	 ﾠconsumers	 ﾠmight	 ﾠwell	 ﾠunderestimate	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ likelihood	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ overdraw	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ accounts	 ﾠ
(Fed.	 ﾠReserve	 ﾠSystem	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2.  In	 ﾠ2014,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFood	 ﾠand	 ﾠDrug	 ﾠAdministration	 ﾠ(FDA)	 ﾠproposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
revise	 ﾠits	 ﾠ“nutrition	 ﾠfacts”	 ﾠpanel,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfound	 ﾠon	 ﾠalmost	 ﾠ
all	 ﾠ food	 ﾠ packages.	 ﾠ Aware	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ obliged	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ identify	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
market	 ﾠ failure	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ regulation	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ address,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ FDA	 ﾠ
stated	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnew	 ﾠlabel	 ﾠcould	 ﾠ“assist	 ﾠconsumers	 ﾠby	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠlong-ﾭ‐term	 ﾠhealth	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠof	 ﾠconsumer	 ﾠfood	 ﾠchoices	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠ salient	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ providing	 ﾠ contextual	 ﾠ cues	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ food	 ﾠ
consumption”	 ﾠ (US	 ﾠ FDA	 ﾠ 2014a).	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ FDA	 ﾠ noted	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
“behavioral	 ﾠ economics	 ﾠ literature	 ﾠ suggests	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ distortions	 ﾠ
internal	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ consumers	 ﾠ (or	 ﾠ internalities)	 ﾠ due	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ time-ﾭ‐
inconsistent	 ﾠ preferences,	 ﾠ myopia	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ present-ﾭ‐biased	 ﾠ
preferences,	 ﾠ visceral	 ﾠ factors	 ﾠ (e.g.,	 ﾠ hunger),	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ lack	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐
control,	 ﾠcan	 ﾠalso	 ﾠcreate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠintervention	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
improve	 ﾠconsumer	 ﾠwelfare”	 ﾠ(US	 ﾠFDA	 ﾠ2014a).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
3.  In	 ﾠ2010,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEnvironmental	 ﾠProtection	 ﾠAgency	 ﾠ(EPA)	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Department	 ﾠof	 ﾠTransportation	 ﾠ(DOT)	 ﾠadopted	 ﾠaggressive	 ﾠfuel	 ﾠ
economy	 ﾠstandards	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmotor	 ﾠvehicles.	 ﾠMost	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠ standards	 ﾠ come	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ economic	 ﾠ savings	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ consumers,	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠ raises	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ puzzle:	 ﾠ Why	 ﾠ can’t	 ﾠ consumers	 ﾠ choose	 ﾠ fuel	 ﾠ
efficient	 ﾠ cars	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ want?	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ answering	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ question,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠ invoked	 ﾠ behavioral	 ﾠ research	 ﾠ suggesting	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
“consumers	 ﾠappear	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠpurchase	 ﾠproducts	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
economic	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐interest”	 ﾠ(US	 ﾠEPA	 ﾠ&	 ﾠUS	 ﾠDOT	 ﾠ2010).	 ﾠIt	 ﾠoffered	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
catalogue	 ﾠof	 ﾠpsychological	 ﾠfindings:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ Consumers	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ myopic	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ hence	 ﾠ
undervalue	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlong-ﾭ‐term.	 ﾠ 
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-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ Consumers	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ lack	 ﾠ information	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ full	 ﾠ
appreciation	 ﾠof	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠeven	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠpresented.	 ﾠ
-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ Consumers	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ especially	 ﾠ averse	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
short-ﾭ‐term	 ﾠ losses	 ﾠ associated	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ higher	 ﾠ prices	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
energy-ﾭ‐efficient	 ﾠproducts	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuncertain	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠ
fuel	 ﾠsavings,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠ
fuel	 ﾠ savings	 ﾠ exceeds	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ cost	 ﾠ (the	 ﾠ behavioral	 ﾠ
phenomenon	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“loss	 ﾠaversion”).	 ﾠ
-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ Even	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ consumers	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ relevant	 ﾠ knowledge,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
benefits	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ energy-ﾭ‐efficient	 ﾠ vehicles	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
sufficiently	 ﾠsalient	 ﾠto	 ﾠthem	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime	 ﾠof	 ﾠpurchase,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠlack	 ﾠof	 ﾠsalience	 ﾠmight	 ﾠlead	 ﾠconsumers	 ﾠto	 ﾠneglect	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
attribute	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ economic	 ﾠ interest	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
consider.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
4.  In	 ﾠ2014,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFDA	 ﾠproposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠassert	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠover	 ﾠa	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
tobacco	 ﾠproducts.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠexplaining	 ﾠits	 ﾠaction,	 ﾠit	 ﾠemphasized	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
there	 ﾠare	 ﾠ"opportunities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠregulation	 ﾠof	 ﾠtobacco	 ﾠproducts	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
enhance	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ welfare	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ population	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ large.	 ﾠ Time	 ﾠ
inconsistency	 ﾠ exists	 ﾠ when	 ﾠ consumers	 ﾠ use	 ﾠ lower	 ﾠ rates	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
discount	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ consequences	 ﾠ far	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ future	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
consequences	 ﾠ close	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ present.	 ﾠ Time-ﾭ‐inconsistent	 ﾠ
consumers	 ﾠmake	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmake	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠselves"	 ﾠ(US	 ﾠFDA	 ﾠ2014b).	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠFDA	 ﾠadded,	 ﾠ"Consumers	 ﾠmay	 ﾠsuffer	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠtime-ﾭ‐inconsistent	 ﾠ
behavior,	 ﾠ problems	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐control,	 ﾠ addiction,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ poor	 ﾠ
information,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠprevent	 ﾠthem	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠfully	 ﾠinternalizing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
benefits	 ﾠof	 ﾠreducing	 ﾠtobacco	 ﾠuse"	 ﾠ(US	 ﾠFDA	 ﾠ2014b).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
From	 ﾠthese	 ﾠexamples,	 ﾠit	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠplain	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates,	 ﾠ
psychological	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠhas	 ﾠplayed	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠ
domains.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ relevant	 ﾠ initiatives	 ﾠ enlist	 ﾠ tools	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ default	 ﾠ rules,	 ﾠ
simplification,	 ﾠdisclosure,	 ﾠand	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠnorms,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfound	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
areas	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ include	 ﾠ fuel	 ﾠ economy,	 ﾠ energy	 ﾠ efficiency,	 ﾠ environmental	 ﾠ
protection,	 ﾠ health	 ﾠ care,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ obesity.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ Consumer	 ﾠ Financial	 ﾠ
Protection	 ﾠBureau,	 ﾠcreated	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2010,	 ﾠis	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠinterested	 ﾠin	 ﾠusing	 ﾠ
psychological	 ﾠ research	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ protect	 ﾠ consumers	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ financial	 ﾠ markets.	 ﾠ
(Consider	 ﾠits	 ﾠmantra:	 ﾠ“know	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠyou	 ﾠowe.”)	 ﾠPsychological	 ﾠfindings,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ behavioral	 ﾠ science	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ generally,	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ become	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ
reference	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpolicymaking	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ2010,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠKingdom	 ﾠcreated	 ﾠa	 ﾠBehavioural	 ﾠInsights	 ﾠTeam	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ specific	 ﾠ goal	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ incorporating	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ understanding	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ human	 ﾠ 
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psychology	 ﾠinto	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠinitiatives.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ official	 ﾠ website	 ﾠ states	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ
“work	 ﾠdraws	 ﾠon	 ﾠinsights	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgrowing	 ﾠbody	 ﾠof	 ﾠacademic	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfields	 ﾠof	 ﾠbehavioural	 ﾠeconomics	 ﾠand	 ﾠpsychology	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠshow	 ﾠhow	 ﾠ
often	 ﾠsubtle	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠare	 ﾠframed	 ﾠcan	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
big	 ﾠimpacts	 ﾠon	 ﾠhow	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠrespond	 ﾠto	 ﾠthem”	 ﾠ(Cabinet	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠ2013).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
Team	 ﾠ uses	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ insights	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ promote	 ﾠ initiatives	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ numerous	 ﾠ areas,	 ﾠ
including	 ﾠ smoking	 ﾠ cessation,	 ﾠ energy	 ﾠ efficiency,	 ﾠ organ	 ﾠ donation,	 ﾠ
consumer	 ﾠ protection,	 ﾠ tax	 ﾠ compliance,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ compliance	 ﾠ strategies	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
general.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ Team	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ enlisted	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ acronym	 ﾠ “EAST”	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ capture	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ
approach:	 ﾠ Easy,	 ﾠ Attractive,	 ﾠ Social,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Timely	 ﾠ
(http://www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk/sites/default/files/BIT%20Pu
blication%20EAST_FA_WEB.pdf).	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠresults	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTeam’s	 ﾠwork	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠmany	 ﾠsubstantial	 ﾠsuccesses	 ﾠ
(for	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ catalogue,	 ﾠ see	 ﾠ
http://www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk/publications).	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠ(1)	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠpsychologically	 ﾠinformed	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠtax	 ﾠpayment	 ﾠrates	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
delinquent	 ﾠ taxpayers	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ 5	 ﾠ percentage	 ﾠ points;	 ﾠ (2)	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ message	 ﾠ
designed	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ prompt	 ﾠ people	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ join	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Organ	 ﾠ Donor	 ﾠ Registry	 ﾠ added	 ﾠ
100,000	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠRegistry	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠyear;	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(3)	 ﾠautomatically	 ﾠ
enrolling	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠin	 ﾠpension	 ﾠschemes	 ﾠhas	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠsaving	 ﾠrates	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
those	 ﾠemployed	 ﾠby	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUK	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ61	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠto	 ﾠ83	 ﾠpercent.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ2014,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTeam	 ﾠmoved	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCabinet	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠto	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠa	 ﾠpartly	 ﾠ
privatized	 ﾠ joint	 ﾠ venture,	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐described	 ﾠ “social	 ﾠ purpose	 ﾠ company”	 ﾠ
owned	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ government,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ team’s	 ﾠ employees,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Nesta	 ﾠ (an	 ﾠ
innovation	 ﾠcharity).	 ﾠOther	 ﾠnations	 ﾠhave	 ﾠexpressed	 ﾠkeen	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
work	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTeam,	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠoperations	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠexpanded.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
idea	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ “nudge	 ﾠ units,”	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ behavioral	 ﾠ insights	 ﾠ teams,	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ receiving	 ﾠ
worldwide	 ﾠattention.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ Germany,	 ﾠ Australia,	 ﾠ Denmark,	 ﾠ Sweden,	 ﾠ Canada,	 ﾠ Singapore,	 ﾠ
Israel,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Netherlands,	 ﾠ South	 ﾠ Korea,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Mexico,	 ﾠ among	 ﾠ others,	 ﾠ
psychological	 ﾠ insights	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ enlisted	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ discussions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
environmental	 ﾠ protection,	 ﾠ financial	 ﾠ reform,	 ﾠ energy	 ﾠ policy,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
consumer	 ﾠprotection.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ2014,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates	 ﾠcreated	 ﾠa	 ﾠbehavioral	 ﾠ
insights	 ﾠ team	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ own,	 ﾠ called	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Social	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Behavioral	 ﾠ Sciences	 ﾠ
Team.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠhoused	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠServices	 ﾠAdministration	 ﾠand	 ﾠrun	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠWhite	 ﾠHouse	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠof	 ﾠScience	 ﾠand	 ﾠTechnology	 ﾠPolicy;	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠengaged	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠa	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠprojects	 ﾠdesigned	 ﾠto	 ﾠtest	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠof	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠpolicies,	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠclose	 ﾠreference	 ﾠto	 ﾠpsychological	 ﾠresearch.	 ﾠ
Behavioral	 ﾠ science	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ drawn	 ﾠ considerable	 ﾠ (and	 ﾠ growing)	 ﾠ
attention	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Europe	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ broadly.	 ﾠ For	 ﾠ example,	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ report	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠ Commission,	 ﾠ called	 ﾠ Green	 ﾠ Behavior,	 ﾠ enlists	 ﾠ behavioral	 ﾠ
science	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ outline	 ﾠ policy	 ﾠ initiatives	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ protect	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ environment	 ﾠ 
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(European	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠ2012,	 ﾠinudgeyou.com	 ﾠ2014).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠOrganisation	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠEconomic	 ﾠDevelopment	 ﾠand	 ﾠCooperation	 ﾠ(OECD)	 ﾠhas	 ﾠpublished	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
Consumer	 ﾠ Policy	 ﾠ Toolkit	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ recommends	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ number	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ initiatives	 ﾠ
rooted	 ﾠin	 ﾠbehavioral	 ﾠfindings	 ﾠ(OECD	 ﾠ2010).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Directorate-ﾭ‐General	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ Health	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Consumers	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ shown	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
influence	 ﾠof	 ﾠpsychology	 ﾠand	 ﾠbehavioral	 ﾠeconomics	 ﾠ(DG	 ﾠSANCO	 ﾠ2010).	 ﾠ
Private	 ﾠorganizations,	 ﾠnotably	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠNudge	 ﾠNetwork,	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠproducing	 ﾠcreative	 ﾠand	 ﾠimaginative	 ﾠuses	 ﾠof	 ﾠbehavioral	 ﾠinsights	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
promote	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ variety	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ environmental,	 ﾠ health-ﾭ‐related,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ goals	 ﾠ
(see	 ﾠinudgeyou.com	 ﾠ2014,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠalso	 ﾠgreeNudge.no	 ﾠ2014).	 ﾠEmphasizing	 ﾠ
relevant	 ﾠpsychological	 ﾠwork,	 ﾠSingapore	 ﾠhas	 ﾠinitiated	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
reforms	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdomain	 ﾠ(Low	 ﾠ2011).	 ﾠ
There	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠin	 ﾠusing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠareas	 ﾠof	 ﾠpoverty	 ﾠand	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠ(Mullainathan	 ﾠ2007,	 ﾠBanerjee	 ﾠ
&	 ﾠ Duflo,	 ﾠ 2012),	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ considerable	 ﾠ attention	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ World	 ﾠ Bank.	 ﾠ
Behaviorally	 ﾠinformed	 ﾠapproaches	 ﾠmight	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠcombat	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
inefficiency,	 ﾠand	 ﾠalso	 ﾠmake	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠprograms	 ﾠmore	 ﾠeffective,	 ﾠin	 ﾠpart	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
combating	 ﾠ low	 ﾠ take-ﾭ‐up	 ﾠ rates	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ improving	 ﾠ well-ﾭ‐motivated	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ
counterproductive	 ﾠinitiatives	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠalert	 ﾠto	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠpsychology	 ﾠ
(cf.	 ﾠMullainathan	 ﾠand	 ﾠShafir	 ﾠ2013).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmounting	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠof	 ﾠpsychology	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
has	 ﾠcomplemented,	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠways	 ﾠcomplicated,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconventional	 ﾠ
emphasis	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠof	 ﾠmaterial	 ﾠincentives.	 ﾠNo	 ﾠone	 ﾠdenies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
actual	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ perceived	 ﾠ costs	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ benefits	 ﾠ matter.	 ﾠ But	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ word	 ﾠ
“perceived”	 ﾠis	 ﾠimportant;	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠhow	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
actually	 ﾠ respond	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ material	 ﾠ incentives.	 ﾠ Sometimes	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ responses	 ﾠ
turn	 ﾠout	 ﾠto	 ﾠsurprise	 ﾠpolicymakers.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠpay	 ﾠattention	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
incentive,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠhave	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠor	 ﾠno	 ﾠimpact,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠin	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠ
terms	 ﾠ (cf.	 ﾠ Chetty	 ﾠ et	 ﾠ al.	 ﾠ 2012),	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ inertia,	 ﾠ inattention,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
procrastination	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ render	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ incentive	 ﾠ irrelevant.	 ﾠ Consider,	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
example,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠnumbers	 ﾠof	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠrefinance	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
mortgages,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthough	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠto	 ﾠgain	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠso	 ﾠ
(Keys	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2014).	 ﾠ
Officials	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ increasingly	 ﾠ aware	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ explore	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
importance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠenvironment,	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠdescribed	 ﾠas	 ﾠ“choice	 ﾠ
architecture”	 ﾠ (Thaler	 ﾠ &	 ﾠ Sunstein	 ﾠ 2008).	 ﾠ Even	 ﾠ when	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ material	 ﾠ
incentives	 ﾠseem	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠor	 ﾠnonexistent,	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠin	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠarchitecture	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠhave	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠon	 ﾠoutcomes	 ﾠ(ibid.;	 ﾠWansink	 ﾠ2014).	 ﾠWhen,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
example,	 ﾠhealthy	 ﾠfoods	 ﾠare	 ﾠprominent	 ﾠand	 ﾠeasily	 ﾠaccessible,	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠ likely	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ choose	 ﾠ them;	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ study	 ﾠ finds	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ 8	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ 16	 ﾠ percent	 ﾠ
decrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠintake	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠby	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠfood	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠreach	 ﾠ(as,	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠ example,	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ varying	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ proximity	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ ten	 ﾠ inches	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ altering	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ 
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serving	 ﾠutensil)	 ﾠ(Rozin	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2011).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠof	 ﾠchildhood	 ﾠobesity	 ﾠ
is,	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠin	 ﾠpart,	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeasy	 ﾠavailability	 ﾠof	 ﾠunhealthy	 ﾠfoods	 ﾠ
(Wansink	 ﾠ2014).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠ–	 ﾠinvolving	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠeasily	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠcommands	 ﾠattention	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠbears	 ﾠon	 ﾠsmoking,	 ﾠalcohol	 ﾠabuse,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
even	 ﾠhappiness,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhas	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠreceiving	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠattention	 ﾠ(Dolan	 ﾠ
2014).	 ﾠ When	 ﾠ job	 ﾠ candidates	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ evaluated	 ﾠ together	 ﾠ rather	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ
independently,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ incidence	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ sex	 ﾠ discrimination	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ reduced,	 ﾠ thus	 ﾠ
suggesting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠnudges	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠdiscrimination	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠdiverse	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠ(Bohnet	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2012).	 ﾠ
Psychologically	 ﾠ informed	 ﾠ initiatives	 ﾠ often	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ major	 ﾠ
consequences.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠautomatic	 ﾠenrollment	 ﾠin	 ﾠsavings	 ﾠprograms	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠhave	 ﾠfar	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠthan	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠincentives	 ﾠ–	 ﾠa	 ﾠclear	 ﾠ
testimonial	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ potential	 ﾠ power	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ choice	 ﾠ architecture	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ
occasionally	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠthan	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠtools	 ﾠ(Chetty	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ
2012).	 ﾠ If	 ﾠ people	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ asked	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ sign	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ first	 ﾠ rather	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ last	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ
especially	 ﾠ minor	 ﾠ change	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ incidence	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ honesty	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ increase	 ﾠ
significantly	 ﾠ (Shu	 ﾠ et	 ﾠ al.	 ﾠ 2012).	 ﾠ Default	 ﾠ rules	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ significant	 ﾠ
impact	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠenvironmental	 ﾠarea,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠon	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠhealth	 ﾠ
(Sunstein	 ﾠ &	 ﾠ Reisch	 ﾠ 2014).	 ﾠ Obesity	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ significantly	 ﾠ reduced	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ
nudges	 ﾠ(Wansink	 ﾠ2014);	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“[b]ecoming	 ﾠ
slim	 ﾠby	 ﾠdesign	 ﾠis	 ﾠeasier	 ﾠthan	 ﾠtrying	 ﾠto	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠslim	 ﾠby	 ﾠwillpower”	 ﾠ(id.).	 ﾠ
There	 ﾠis	 ﾠeven	 ﾠa	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠhappiness	 ﾠ“by	 ﾠdesign,”	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠ
if	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ focus	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ overriding	 ﾠ importance	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ where	 ﾠ our	 ﾠ attention	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
directed	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(Dolan	 ﾠ2014).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ catalogue	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ potentially	 ﾠ effective	 ﾠ choice-ﾭ‐preserving	 ﾠ
interventions	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ large	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ growing.	 ﾠ For	 ﾠ example,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ includes	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
following:	 ﾠ(1)	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrules	 ﾠ(including	 ﾠautomatic	 ﾠenrollment	 ﾠin	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠ
programs,	 ﾠ involving	 ﾠ education,	 ﾠ health,	 ﾠ food,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ savings);	 ﾠ (2)	 ﾠ
simplification	 ﾠ (and	 ﾠ perhaps	 ﾠ radical	 ﾠ simplification)	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ existing	 ﾠ
requirements;	 ﾠ (3)	 ﾠ insistence	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ active	 ﾠ choosing;	 ﾠ (4)	 ﾠ reminders	 ﾠ
(perhaps	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ email	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ text	 ﾠ message);	 ﾠ (5)	 ﾠ priming	 ﾠ (perhaps	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ
emphasizing	 ﾠsome	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠor	 ﾠsome	 ﾠaspect	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
people’s	 ﾠ identity);	 ﾠ (6)	 ﾠ eliciting	 ﾠ implementation	 ﾠ intentions	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ
commitments	 ﾠ(“do	 ﾠyou	 ﾠplan	 ﾠto	 ﾠvote?”);	 ﾠ(7)	 ﾠuses	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠ(“most	 ﾠ
people	 ﾠplan	 ﾠto	 ﾠvote”);	 ﾠ(8)	 ﾠorder	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠ(what	 ﾠdo	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠsee	 ﾠfirst?);	 ﾠ(9)	 ﾠ
use	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ loss	 ﾠ aversion	 ﾠ (“you	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ lose	 ﾠ $X	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ you	 ﾠ do	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ use	 ﾠ energy	 ﾠ
conservation	 ﾠ techniques,”	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ alternatively,	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ very	 ﾠ small	 ﾠ tax);	 ﾠ (10)	 ﾠ
increases	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ ease	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ convenience	 ﾠ (“make	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ easy”	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ frequent	 ﾠ
behavioral	 ﾠ advice);	 ﾠ (11)	 ﾠ framing	 ﾠ (“10	 ﾠ percent	 ﾠ fat”	 ﾠ rather	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ “90	 ﾠ
percent	 ﾠfat-ﾭ‐free”);	 ﾠ(12)	 ﾠdisclosure	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠin	 ﾠcalorie	 ﾠcounts	 ﾠor	 ﾠtraffic	 ﾠlights	 ﾠ
systems	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfood);	 ﾠ(13)	 ﾠwarnings,	 ﾠgraphic	 ﾠor	 ﾠotherwise;	 ﾠ(14)	 ﾠcooling	 ﾠoff	 ﾠ
periods;	 ﾠ (15)	 ﾠ precommitment	 ﾠ strategies	 ﾠ (consider	 ﾠ Save	 ﾠ More	 ﾠ 
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Tomorrow	 ﾠor	 ﾠGive	 ﾠMore	 ﾠTomorrow	 ﾠor	 ﾠLose	 ﾠWeight	 ﾠTomorrow);	 ﾠ(16)	 ﾠ
automatic	 ﾠ enrollment	 ﾠ combined	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ precommitment;	 ﾠ (17)	 ﾠ uses	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
colors	 ﾠand	 ﾠfonts,	 ﾠ(18)	 ﾠplain	 ﾠlanguage;	 ﾠ(19)	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠto	 ﾠattract	 ﾠor	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠ
attention,	 ﾠ including	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ product	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ attribute	 ﾠ placement	 ﾠ (for	 ﾠ
example,	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠcafeteria	 ﾠdesign,	 ﾠWansink	 ﾠ2014);	 ﾠ (20)	 ﾠ engaging	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
moral	 ﾠsuasion,	 ﾠattempting	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠfun,	 ﾠor	 ﾠtriggering	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
sense	 ﾠof	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠ(“Don’t	 ﾠMess	 ﾠWith	 ﾠTexas”);	 ﾠ(21)	 ﾠchecklists	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠadministrators	 ﾠor	 ﾠdoctors);	 ﾠ(22)	 ﾠprompted	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠ(where	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠ asked	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ question	 ﾠ without	 ﾠ being	 ﾠ required	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ answer);	 ﾠ (23)	 ﾠ
simplified	 ﾠactive	 ﾠchoosing	 ﾠ(where	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠare	 ﾠasked	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwant	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ choose	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ instead	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ rely	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ default	 ﾠ rule);	 ﾠ (24)	 ﾠ enhanced	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ
influenced	 ﾠactive	 ﾠchoosing	 ﾠ(for	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠasking	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠto	 ﾠchoose	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
using	 ﾠorder	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠor	 ﾠloss	 ﾠaversion	 ﾠto	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠchoices);	 ﾠ(25)	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
make	 ﾠcontexts,	 ﾠsituations,	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠmore	 ﾠeasily	 ﾠnavigable,	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠ
pointers	 ﾠand	 ﾠguides	 ﾠ(consider	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGPS);	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(26)	 ﾠpaperwork	 ﾠreduction	 ﾠ
(including	 ﾠprepopulation	 ﾠof	 ﾠforms,	 ﾠelimination	 ﾠof	 ﾠforms,	 ﾠand	 ﾠreductions	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠquestions).	 ﾠ(See	 ﾠAppendix	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠsomewhat	 ﾠlonger	 ﾠone-ﾭ‐page	 ﾠlist.)	 ﾠAs	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠfuel	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠexample	 ﾠindicates,	 ﾠand	 ﾠimportantly,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ favor	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ mandates	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ bans	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ psychological	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ behavioral	 ﾠ
grounds,	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠcalculus	 ﾠso	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠ(Bubb	 ﾠand	 ﾠPildes	 ﾠ
2014,	 ﾠSunstein	 ﾠ2014).	 ﾠ
Of	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠremains	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠlearned,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
effects	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ reforms	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ large	 ﾠ populations,	 ﾠ across	 ﾠ cultures,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ
potentially	 ﾠ distinctive	 ﾠ subpopulations.	 ﾠ One	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ
developments	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ recent	 ﾠ years	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ emphasis	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ rigorous	 ﾠ
testing	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠto	 ﾠidentify	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠeffects.	 ﾠAt	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠlevels,	 ﾠrandomized	 ﾠ
controlled	 ﾠtrials	 ﾠare	 ﾠgrowing	 ﾠin	 ﾠpopularity	 ﾠ(Sunstein	 ﾠ2013a),	 ﾠand	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠ often	 ﾠ essential.	 ﾠ But	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ stage,	 ﾠ psychological	 ﾠ research	 ﾠ
suggests	 ﾠsix	 ﾠconcrete	 ﾠlessons	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpolicy:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
(1)  default	 ﾠrules	 ﾠare	 ﾠan	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠpromising	 ﾠtool,	 ﾠcombining	 ﾠ
effectiveness	 ﾠwith	 ﾠpreservation	 ﾠof	 ﾠfreedom	 ﾠof	 ﾠchoice;	 ﾠ
(2)  in	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠactive	 ﾠchoosing	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpreferable	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrules	 ﾠinsofar	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠcounteracts	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
inertia	 ﾠ while	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ responding	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ risk	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
policymakers	 ﾠmay	 ﾠerr	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠrely	 ﾠon	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrules;	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
(3)  simplification	 ﾠoften	 ﾠpays	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠdividends,	 ﾠin	 ﾠpart	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠ reduces	 ﾠ burdens	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ people’s	 ﾠ “bandwidth,”	 ﾠ
(Mullainathan	 ﾠ &	 ﾠ Shafir	 ﾠ 2013),	 ﾠ potentially	 ﾠ increasing	 ﾠ
uptake	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ programs	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ reducing	 ﾠ serious	 ﾠ
burdens	 ﾠon	 ﾠordinary	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠ(especially	 ﾠbut	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
poor);	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 
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(4)  policymakers	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ fruitfully	 ﾠ enlist	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ norms	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
service	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠgoals,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠare	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
engage	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ desirable	 ﾠ behavior	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ informed	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
most	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠengage	 ﾠin	 ﾠdesirable	 ﾠbehavior.	 ﾠ
(5)  disclosure	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠhelpful,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠonly	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠpsychologically	 ﾠ
informed	 ﾠ(Loewenstein	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2014b);	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
(6)  cognitive	 ﾠaccessibility	 ﾠ (sometimes	 ﾠ described	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ salience)	 ﾠ
greatly	 ﾠ matters,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ part	 ﾠ because	 ﾠ people	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ limited	 ﾠ
attention	 ﾠ(Dolan	 ﾠ2014).	 ﾠ
Notwithstanding	 ﾠthese	 ﾠlessons,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠto	 ﾠacknowledge	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ very	 ﾠ idea	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ Council	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Psychological	 ﾠ Advisers,	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
psychologically	 ﾠ informed	 ﾠ policymaking,	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ produce	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ
concern,	 ﾠ possibly	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ alarm.	 ﾠ Indeed,	 ﾠ prominent	 ﾠ uses	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ behavioral	 ﾠ
science	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ sometimes	 ﾠ proved	 ﾠ controversial	 ﾠ (Rebonato	 ﾠ 2012;	 ﾠ
Sunstein	 ﾠ2013a).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠgoal	 ﾠof	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠsimplification	 ﾠand	 ﾠnavigability	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠunlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠraise	 ﾠserious	 ﾠconcerns,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠany	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠpaternalism	 ﾠmight	 ﾠ
run	 ﾠinto	 ﾠreal	 ﾠobjections	 ﾠ(for	 ﾠvery	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠperspectives,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠRebonato,	 ﾠ
2012,	 ﾠConly,	 ﾠ2012).	 ﾠAs	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshall	 ﾠsee,	 ﾠtransparency	 ﾠand	 ﾠopenness	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
exceedingly	 ﾠimportant.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠbehaviorally	 ﾠinformed	 ﾠpolicymaking	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠ raises	 ﾠ significant	 ﾠ institutional	 ﾠ challenges.	 ﾠ A	 ﾠ concluding	 ﾠ section	 ﾠ
briefly	 ﾠexplores	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠand	 ﾠissues	 ﾠof	 ﾠpaternalism	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
institutional	 ﾠdesign	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠalso	 ﾠThaler	 ﾠ&	 ﾠSunstein	 ﾠ2008,	 ﾠRebonato	 ﾠ2012).	 ﾠ
II.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠDEFAULT	 ﾠRULES	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ many	 ﾠ contexts,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ possible	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ promote	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ goals	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ
sensible	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrules	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpreserve	 ﾠfreedom	 ﾠof	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmight	 ﾠ
help	 ﾠto	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrigidity,	 ﾠcost,	 ﾠand	 ﾠunintended	 ﾠadverse	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ mandates	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ bans	 ﾠ (Thaler	 ﾠ &	 ﾠ Sunstein	 ﾠ 2008,	 ﾠ Sunstein	 ﾠ &	 ﾠ Reisch	 ﾠ
2014).	 ﾠBecause	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠunique	 ﾠimportance,	 ﾠI	 ﾠdevote	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠattention	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
default	 ﾠ rules	 ﾠ here	 ﾠ (for	 ﾠ interesting	 ﾠ applications,	 ﾠ see	 ﾠ Wansink	 ﾠ 2014,	 ﾠ
Dolan	 ﾠ2014).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
A.	 ﾠAutomatic	 ﾠEnrollment	 ﾠand	 ﾠDefault	 ﾠRules:	 ﾠExamples	 ﾠ
1.  Savings.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates,	 ﾠemployers	 ﾠhave	 ﾠlong	 ﾠasked	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠenroll	 ﾠin	 ﾠ401(k)	 ﾠplans;	 ﾠunder	 ﾠa	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠapproach,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
default	 ﾠ rule	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ nonenrollment.	 ﾠ Even	 ﾠ when	 ﾠ enrollment	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ easy,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
number	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ employees	 ﾠ who	 ﾠ enroll,	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ opt	 ﾠ in,	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ sometimes	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ
relatively	 ﾠlow	 ﾠ(Madrian	 ﾠ&	 ﾠShea	 ﾠ2001,	 ﾠGale	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠA	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
employers	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ responded	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ changing	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ default	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ automatic	 ﾠ 
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enrollment,	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠemployees	 ﾠare	 ﾠenrolled	 ﾠunless	 ﾠthey	 ﾠopt	 ﾠout.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
results	 ﾠare	 ﾠclear:	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠmore	 ﾠemployees	 ﾠend	 ﾠup	 ﾠenrolled	 ﾠwith	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
opt-ﾭ‐out	 ﾠdesign	 ﾠthan	 ﾠwith	 ﾠopt-ﾭ‐in	 ﾠ(Gale	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2009,	 ﾠChetty	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2012).	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ so	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ when	 ﾠ opting	 ﾠ out	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ easy.	 ﾠ Importantly,	 ﾠ automatic	 ﾠ
enrollment	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ significant	 ﾠ benefits	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ groups,	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ increased	 ﾠ
anticipated	 ﾠ savings	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ Hispanics,	 ﾠ African	 ﾠ Americans,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ women	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
particular	 ﾠ (Orszag	 ﾠ &	 ﾠ Rodriguez	 ﾠ 2009,	 ﾠ Papke	 ﾠ et	 ﾠ al.	 ﾠ 2009,	 ﾠ Chiteji	 ﾠ &	 ﾠ
Walker	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠAs	 ﾠnoted,	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrules	 ﾠcan	 ﾠhave	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
significant	 ﾠtax	 ﾠincentives	 ﾠ(Chetty	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2012)	 ﾠ–	 ﾠa	 ﾠgenuine	 ﾠpuzzle	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠstandpoint	 ﾠof	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠeconomics,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠa	 ﾠfar	 ﾠless	 ﾠsurprising	 ﾠfinding	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandpoint	 ﾠof	 ﾠpsychology.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠPension	 ﾠProtection	 ﾠAct	 ﾠof	 ﾠ2006	 ﾠ(PPA)	 ﾠ(Pension	 ﾠProtection	 ﾠAct	 ﾠ
2006)	 ﾠdraws	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠon	 ﾠthese	 ﾠfindings	 ﾠby	 ﾠencouraging	 ﾠemployers	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
adopt	 ﾠ automatic	 ﾠ enrollment	 ﾠ plans.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ PPA	 ﾠ does	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ providing	 ﾠ
nondiscrimination	 ﾠsafe	 ﾠharbors	 ﾠfor	 ﾠelective	 ﾠdeferrals	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmatching	 ﾠ
contributions	 ﾠ under	 ﾠ plans	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ include	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ automatic	 ﾠ enrollment	 ﾠ
feature,	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ well	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ providing	 ﾠ protections	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ state	 ﾠ payroll-ﾭ‐
withholding	 ﾠlaws	 ﾠto	 ﾠallow	 ﾠfor	 ﾠautomatic	 ﾠenrollment.	 ﾠBuilding	 ﾠon	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
efforts,	 ﾠPresident	 ﾠObama	 ﾠdirected	 ﾠthe	 ﾠInternal	 ﾠRevenue	 ﾠService	 ﾠ(IRS)	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTreasury	 ﾠDepartment	 ﾠto	 ﾠundertake	 ﾠinitiatives	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠit	 ﾠeasier	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠ employers	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ adopt	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ plans	 ﾠ (Obama	 ﾠ 2009a,	 ﾠ IRS	 ﾠ 2009).	 ﾠ As	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
result	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ private	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ action,	 ﾠ informed	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ psychological	 ﾠ
research,	 ﾠ automatic	 ﾠ enrollment	 ﾠ (along	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ automatic	 ﾠ escalation,	 ﾠ
sometimes	 ﾠ under	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ rubric	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ “Save	 ﾠ More	 ﾠ Tomorrow”)	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ
growing	 ﾠrapidly	 ﾠ(Benartzi	 ﾠ&	 ﾠThaler	 ﾠ2013,	 ﾠBenartzi	 ﾠ2012).	 ﾠ
Automatic	 ﾠ enrollment	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ used	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ many	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ nations.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ
2007,	 ﾠNew	 ﾠZealand	 ﾠintroduced	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“KiwiSaver,”	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠprincipal	 ﾠ
feature	 ﾠis	 ﾠauto-ﾭ‐enrollment.	 ﾠWithin	 ﾠfour	 ﾠyears,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinitiative	 ﾠ
was	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ increase	 ﾠ pension	 ﾠ coverage	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ nearly	 ﾠ 50	 ﾠ percentage	 ﾠ points	 ﾠ
(Lunn	 ﾠ2014).	 ﾠAs	 ﾠnoted,	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠsuccess	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠfound	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠ
Kingdom,	 ﾠand	 ﾠDenmark	 ﾠhas	 ﾠalso	 ﾠexperienced	 ﾠsubstantial	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
result	 ﾠof	 ﾠautomatic	 ﾠenrollment	 ﾠ(Chetty	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2012).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2.  Green	 ﾠenergy.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Many	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠinterested	 ﾠin	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠconsumers’	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
“green	 ﾠenergy”-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐energy	 ﾠsources	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠcontribute	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
air	 ﾠpollution,	 ﾠclimate	 ﾠchange,	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠenvironmental	 ﾠproblems.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠsources	 ﾠare	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠin	 ﾠmany	 ﾠplaces,	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠfew	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠ
choose	 ﾠthem	 ﾠ(notwithstanding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠto	 ﾠquestions,	 ﾠ
Pichert	 ﾠ&	 ﾠKatsikopoulos	 ﾠ(2008)	 ﾠfound	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmany	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
do	 ﾠso).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠholds	 ﾠin	 ﾠGermany	 ﾠ(ibid.).	 ﾠNonetheless,	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠ 
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communities	 ﾠin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnation	 ﾠhave	 ﾠlong	 ﾠshown	 ﾠstrikingly	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
green	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠuse	 ﾠ–	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠperiod,	 ﾠwell	 ﾠover	 ﾠ90	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠ(ibid.).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ dramatic	 ﾠ contrast	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ level	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ participation	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ green	 ﾠ energy	 ﾠ
programs	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ German	 ﾠ towns,	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ relevant	 ﾠ time	 ﾠ
period	 ﾠaround	 ﾠone	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠ(ibid.).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthose	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠcommunities,	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠare	 ﾠautomatically	 ﾠenrolled	 ﾠin	 ﾠgreen	 ﾠ
energy	 ﾠprograms,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠopt	 ﾠout.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠmany	 ﾠcontexts,	 ﾠenvironmental	 ﾠand	 ﾠenergy-ﾭ‐related	 ﾠgoals	 ﾠmight	 ﾠ
be,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠsome	 ﾠextent	 ﾠare	 ﾠbeing,	 ﾠpromoted	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠgreen	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrules	 ﾠ
(Sunstein	 ﾠ&	 ﾠReisch	 ﾠ2014).	 ﾠTo	 ﾠtake	 ﾠa	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠbut	 ﾠrevealing	 ﾠexample:	 ﾠA	 ﾠ
double-ﾭ‐sided	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrule	 ﾠfor	 ﾠprinters	 ﾠis	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠsave	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
paper,	 ﾠand	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠthan	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠtax	 ﾠon	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠ
use	 ﾠ(for	 ﾠcitations	 ﾠand	 ﾠdiscussion,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠSunstein	 ﾠ&	 ﾠReisch	 ﾠ2014).	 ﾠ
3.  Health	 ﾠcare.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAffordable	 ﾠCare	 ﾠAct	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠemployers	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
over	 ﾠ two	 ﾠ hundred	 ﾠ employees	 ﾠ automatically	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ enroll	 ﾠ employees	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
health	 ﾠcare	 ﾠplans,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠalso	 ﾠallowing	 ﾠemployees	 ﾠto	 ﾠopt	 ﾠout	 ﾠ(Patient	 ﾠ
Protection	 ﾠand	 ﾠAffordable	 ﾠCare	 ﾠAct	 ﾠ2010).	 ﾠAnother	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAct	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠcalled	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommunity	 ﾠLiving	 ﾠAssistance	 ﾠServices	 ﾠand	 ﾠSupports	 ﾠAct	 ﾠ
(CLASS	 ﾠ Act)	 ﾠ (CLASS	 ﾠ Act	 ﾠ 2010);	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ provision	 ﾠ creates	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ national	 ﾠ
voluntary	 ﾠ long-ﾭ‐term	 ﾠ insurance	 ﾠ program.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ Act	 ﾠ provides	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ
automatic	 ﾠenrollment	 ﾠsystem,	 ﾠwhereby	 ﾠemployers	 ﾠenroll	 ﾠemployees	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠprogram	 ﾠunless	 ﾠthey	 ﾠopt	 ﾠout	 ﾠ(CLASS	 ﾠAct	 ﾠ2010).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠaddition,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAct	 ﾠ
contains	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ automatic	 ﾠ payroll	 ﾠ deduction	 ﾠ system	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ payment	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
premiums	 ﾠ(CLASS	 ﾠAct	 ﾠ2010).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ 2010,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Centers	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ Medicare	 ﾠ &	 ﾠ Medicaid	 ﾠ Services	 ﾠ (CMS)	 ﾠ
provided	 ﾠguidance	 ﾠto	 ﾠstates	 ﾠvia	 ﾠa	 ﾠState	 ﾠHealth	 ﾠOfficial	 ﾠ(SHO)	 ﾠletter	 ﾠ(CMS	 ﾠ
2010).	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ cases	 ﾠ where	 ﾠ states	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ able	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ obtain	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ information	 ﾠ
necessary	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ determine	 ﾠ eligibility,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ new	 ﾠ option	 ﾠ permits	 ﾠ States	 ﾠ
automatically	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ enroll	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ renew	 ﾠ eligible	 ﾠ children	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Medicaid	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ
Children’s	 ﾠ Health	 ﾠ Insurance	 ﾠ Program	 ﾠ (CHIP).	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ approach	 ﾠ allows	 ﾠ
states	 ﾠto	 ﾠinitiate	 ﾠand	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠeligibility	 ﾠfor	 ﾠMedicaid	 ﾠor	 ﾠCHIP	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠsigned	 ﾠMedicaid	 ﾠor	 ﾠCHIP	 ﾠprogram	 ﾠapplication.	 ﾠ
4.  Consumer	 ﾠrights.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠareas,	 ﾠpolicymakers	 ﾠhave	 ﾠattempted	 ﾠto	 ﾠprotect	 ﾠ
consumer	 ﾠrights	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠregulation	 ﾠof	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrules.	 ﾠRecall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaction	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠFederal	 ﾠReserve	 ﾠBoard,	 ﾠforbidding	 ﾠautomatic	 ﾠenrollment	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
overdraft	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠprograms	 ﾠ(Willis	 ﾠ2013).	 ﾠUnder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCredit	 ﾠCard	 ﾠ
Accountability	 ﾠResponsibility	 ﾠand	 ﾠDisclosure	 ﾠAct	 ﾠof	 ﾠ2009,	 ﾠcompanies	 ﾠ 
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are	 ﾠforbidden	 ﾠto	 ﾠimpose	 ﾠfees	 ﾠon	 ﾠcardholders	 ﾠwho	 ﾠgo	 ﾠover	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcredit	 ﾠ
limit	 ﾠunless	 ﾠcardholders	 ﾠagree	 ﾠto	 ﾠopt	 ﾠin	 ﾠto	 ﾠauthorize	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠ
(ibid.).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠEurope,	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ22	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠConsumer	 ﾠRights	 ﾠDirective	 ﾠ
explicitly	 ﾠbans	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠpre-ﾭ‐filled	 ﾠboxes	 ﾠin	 ﾠonline	 ﾠpayment	 ﾠforms:	 ﾠ“If	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠtrader	 ﾠhas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠobtained	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconsumer’s	 ﾠexpress	 ﾠconsent	 ﾠbut	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
inferred	 ﾠit	 ﾠby	 ﾠusing	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠoptions	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconsumer	 ﾠis	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
reject	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠpayment,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconsumer	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
entitled	 ﾠto	 ﾠreimbursement	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpayment.”	 ﾠ(European	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠ&	 ﾠ
Council	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠ2011;	 ﾠLunn	 ﾠ2014).	 ﾠ
5.  School	 ﾠmeals.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Under	 ﾠfederal	 ﾠlaw,	 ﾠpoor	 ﾠchildren	 ﾠare	 ﾠeligible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfree	 ﾠlunches	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
breakfasts	 ﾠat	 ﾠschool.	 ﾠUnfortunately,	 ﾠmany	 ﾠpoor	 ﾠfamilies	 ﾠhave	 ﾠfailed	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
sign	 ﾠ up	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ relevant	 ﾠ programs,	 ﾠ perhaps	 ﾠ because	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ burdens	 ﾠ
involved	 ﾠin	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠso	 ﾠ–	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠin	 ﾠlight	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠ
bandwidth	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoor	 ﾠ(Mullainathan	 ﾠ&	 ﾠShafir	 ﾠ2013).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠresponse,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
National	 ﾠ School	 ﾠ Lunch	 ﾠ Act	 ﾠ (Healthy,	 ﾠ Hunger-ﾭ‐Free	 ﾠ Kids	 ﾠ Act	 ﾠ 2010)	 ﾠ
authorizes	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ promotes	 ﾠ “direct	 ﾠ certification”	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ eligibility,	 ﾠ thus	 ﾠ
reducing	 ﾠ complexity	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ introducing	 ﾠ what	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ form	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ automatic	 ﾠ
enrollment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Under	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprogram,	 ﾠchildren	 ﾠwho	 ﾠare	 ﾠeligible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠunder	 ﾠ
certain	 ﾠ programs	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ “directly	 ﾠ eligible”	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ free	 ﾠ lunches	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ free	 ﾠ
breakfasts,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhence	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ have	 ﾠto	 ﾠfill	 ﾠout	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠapplications	 ﾠ
(Healthy,	 ﾠHunger-ﾭ‐Free	 ﾠKids	 ﾠAct	 ﾠ 2010).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ2011,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUSDA	 ﾠissued	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
interim	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠrule	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠup	 ﾠto	 ﾠ270,000	 ﾠchildren	 ﾠwith	 ﾠschool	 ﾠ
meals	 ﾠ(USDA	 ﾠ2011a).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠschool	 ﾠchildren	 ﾠnow	 ﾠenrolled	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“direct	 ﾠcertification”	 ﾠprogram	 ﾠexceeds	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠ(USDA	 ﾠ2013).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
6.  Electronic	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠstatements.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ 2010,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Department	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Homeland	 ﾠ Security	 ﾠ changed	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
default	 ﾠsetting	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpayroll	 ﾠstatements	 ﾠto	 ﾠelectronic	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠpaper,	 ﾠthus	 ﾠ
reducing	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠ(Orszag	 ﾠ2010).	 ﾠChanges	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠkind	 ﾠmay	 ﾠsave	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠ
sums	 ﾠof	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠfor	 ﾠboth	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠand	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsectors.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
B.	 ﾠExplanations	 ﾠ
Why	 ﾠdo	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrules	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠeffects,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
departing	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthem	 ﾠis	 ﾠclose	 ﾠto	 ﾠzero?	 ﾠA	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠof	 ﾠpsychological	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
behavioral	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠhas	 ﾠattempted	 ﾠto	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠthat	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠ(Gale	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ
2009,	 ﾠDinner	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2011,	 ﾠCarroll	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2009,	 ﾠJohnson	 ﾠ&	 ﾠGoldstein	 ﾠ2013,	 ﾠ
Sunstein	 ﾠ 2013b).	 ﾠ There	 ﾠ appear	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ three	 ﾠ contributing	 ﾠ factors	 ﾠ
(Johnson	 ﾠ&	 ﾠGoldstein	 ﾠ2013,	 ﾠSunstein	 ﾠ2015b).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠfactor	 ﾠinvolves	 ﾠ 
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what	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠimplicit	 ﾠendorsement	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrule	 ﾠ
(McKenzie	 ﾠet	 ﾠal	 ﾠ2006).	 ﾠMany	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠappear	 ﾠto	 ﾠconclude	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠ
was	 ﾠchosen	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠreason;	 ﾠthey	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdepart	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠunless	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠto	 ﾠjustify	 ﾠa	 ﾠchange.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠfactor	 ﾠ involves	 ﾠ inertia	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ procrastination.	 ﾠ To	 ﾠ alter	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ effect	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ default	 ﾠ rule,	 ﾠ people	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ make	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ active	 ﾠ choice	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
reject	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefault.	 ﾠThey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠexpend	 ﾠsome	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsense	 ﾠ
incur	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠ(even	 ﾠif	 ﾠthose	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠare	 ﾠpurely	 ﾠpsychological).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠview	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠof	 ﾠinertia	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtendency	 ﾠto	 ﾠprocrastinate,	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠmay	 ﾠ
simply	 ﾠcontinue	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠquo,	 ﾠthus	 ﾠavoiding	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
kind	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“effort	 ﾠtax”	 ﾠ(Johnson	 ﾠ&	 ﾠGoldstein	 ﾠ2013).	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ follows	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐
consciously	 ﾠand	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐chosen	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrules	 ﾠby	 ﾠindividuals,	 ﾠor	 ﾠby	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠinstitutions,	 ﾠcan	 ﾠoperate	 ﾠas	 ﾠcommitment	 ﾠdevices;	 ﾠconsider,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
example,	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrule	 ﾠin	 ﾠfavor	 ﾠof	 ﾠmonthly	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠof	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
savings	 ﾠaccount,	 ﾠor	 ﾠin	 ﾠfavor	 ﾠof	 ﾠsavings	 ﾠfor	 ﾠretirement.	 ﾠ
Third,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ default	 ﾠ rule	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ establish	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ reference	 ﾠ point	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
people’s	 ﾠ decisions.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ established	 ﾠ reference	 ﾠ point	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ significant	 ﾠ
effects	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠdislike	 ﾠlosses	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthat	 ﾠreference	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
psychological	 ﾠ finding	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ “loss	 ﾠ aversion”	 ﾠ (Sunstein	 ﾠ 2013b).	 ﾠ If,	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
example,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrule	 ﾠfavors	 ﾠenergy-ﾭ‐efficient	 ﾠlight	 ﾠbulbs,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
loss	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠreduced	 ﾠefficiency)	 ﾠmay	 ﾠloom	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠand	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
tendency	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontinue	 ﾠwith	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠefficient	 ﾠlight	 ﾠbulbs.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠ
rule	 ﾠfavors	 ﾠless	 ﾠefficient	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠinitially	 ﾠless	 ﾠexpensive)	 ﾠlight	 ﾠbulbs,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠloss	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠupfront	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠmay	 ﾠloom	 ﾠlarge,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
tendency	 ﾠto	 ﾠfavor	 ﾠless	 ﾠefficient	 ﾠlight	 ﾠbulbs.	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠ follows	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ default	 ﾠ rules	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ “stick”	 ﾠ when	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ relevant	 ﾠ
population	 ﾠhas	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠcontrary	 ﾠpreferences.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠa	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
United	 ﾠKingdom	 ﾠfound	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmost	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠrejected	 ﾠa	 ﾠsavings	 ﾠplan	 ﾠwith	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
unusually	 ﾠ high	 ﾠ default	 ﾠ contribution	 ﾠ rate	 ﾠ (12	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ before-ﾭ‐tax	 ﾠ
income)	 ﾠ(Beshears	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2010).	 ﾠOnly	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ25	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠemployees	 ﾠ
remained	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ rate	 ﾠ after	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ year,	 ﾠ whereas	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ 60	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ employees	 ﾠ
remained	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠlower	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠcontribution	 ﾠrate	 ﾠ(Beshears	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2010).	 ﾠ
One	 ﾠ implication	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ “extreme”	 ﾠ defaults	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ less	 ﾠ likely	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ stick;	 ﾠ
another	 ﾠimplication,	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlower	 ﾠincomes	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwho	 ﾠstayed	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefault,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrules	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠinfluential	 ﾠfor	 ﾠlow-ﾭ‐
income	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠthan	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠhigher-ﾭ‐earning	 ﾠcounterparts	 ﾠ(Beshears	 ﾠ
et	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2010).	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠ related	 ﾠ finding	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ workers	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ much	 ﾠ affected	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
default	 ﾠallocation	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠfraction	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠtax	 ﾠrefund	 ﾠto	 ﾠUS	 ﾠsavings	 ﾠbonds,	 ﾠ
apparently	 ﾠ because	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ workers	 ﾠ had	 ﾠ definite	 ﾠ plans	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ spend	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ
refunds	 ﾠ(Bronchetti	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2013).	 ﾠA	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠlesson	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrules	 ﾠ
will	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠweaker	 ﾠeffect,	 ﾠand	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠno	 ﾠeffect,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠ 
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population	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠpreference	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠoutcome.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠ
setting	 ﾠon	 ﾠthermometer	 ﾠis	 ﾠset	 ﾠdown	 ﾠby	 ﾠ1	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠC	 ﾠin	 ﾠwinter,	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠ
economic	 ﾠand	 ﾠenvironmental	 ﾠsavings	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexpected;	 ﾠbut	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠset	 ﾠ
down	 ﾠby	 ﾠ2	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠC,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsavings	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠlower,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
reject	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠ(Brown	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2013).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠimplication,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
profound,	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdescribed	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠslogan:	 ﾠDefaults	 ﾠwill	 ﾠstick	 ﾠunless	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
make	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠcold.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
C.	 ﾠRisks.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Needless	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrules	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbadly	 ﾠchosen	 ﾠor	 ﾠmisused	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
private	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ institutions	 ﾠ alike.	 ﾠ A	 ﾠ central	 ﾠ question	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
intersection	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ psychology,	 ﾠ economics,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ policy	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ whether	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
relevant	 ﾠ rule	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ informed	 ﾠ choosers	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ select	 ﾠ (Sunstein	 ﾠ
2015b).	 ﾠBoth	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠeconomics	 ﾠand	 ﾠpsychology	 ﾠidentify	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
markets	 ﾠmight	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠharmful	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrules,	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠ visible	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ easily	 ﾠ accessible	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ consumers.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Self-ﾭ‐interested	 ﾠ actors	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠpromote	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrules	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠthem	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠchoosers,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠrules	 ﾠmight	 ﾠnonetheless	 ﾠstick.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ Federal	 ﾠ Trade	 ﾠ Commission	 ﾠ (FTC)	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ expressed	 ﾠ serious	 ﾠ
concerns	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ“negative	 ﾠoption	 ﾠmarketing,”	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠoccurs	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthose	 ﾠ
who	 ﾠaccept	 ﾠa	 ﾠ“free”	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠare	 ﾠautomatically	 ﾠenrolled	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠplan	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
program	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcarries	 ﾠa	 ﾠmonthly	 ﾠfee	 ﾠ(unless	 ﾠthey	 ﾠexplicitly	 ﾠopt	 ﾠout)	 ﾠ(16	 ﾠ
C.F.R.	 ﾠ§	 ﾠ425;	 ﾠFTC	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠoption	 ﾠmarketing	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠunfortunate	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠusing	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrule	 ﾠto	 ﾠexploit	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtendency	 ﾠ
toward	 ﾠinertia	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠharmful	 ﾠto	 ﾠpeople’s	 ﾠwelfare;	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠeasy	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
imagine	 ﾠboth	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠand	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠanalogues	 ﾠ(consider,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
automatic	 ﾠenrollment	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠthat	 ﾠputs	 ﾠan	 ﾠunreasonably	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠamount	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
salary	 ﾠinto	 ﾠsavings).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
To	 ﾠ evaluate	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ use	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ automatic	 ﾠ enrollment,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ particular	 ﾠ
circumstances	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠmatter.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠautomatic	 ﾠenrollment	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmade	 ﾠ
transparent	 ﾠto	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwho	 ﾠare	 ﾠenrolled,	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠa	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
manipulation,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠis	 ﾠworse	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠlong-ﾭ‐term	 ﾠ
interest.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
D.	 ﾠPersonalization.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Some	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrules	 ﾠapply	 ﾠto	 ﾠall	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠpopulation,	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠthe	 ﾠability	 ﾠto	 ﾠopt	 ﾠout.	 ﾠOther	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrules	 ﾠare	 ﾠpersonalized,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
sense	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdraw	 ﾠon	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠ
best	 ﾠsuits	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠpopulation	 ﾠ(Sunstein	 ﾠ2013b).	 ﾠA	 ﾠ
personalized	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠgeographical	 ﾠor	 ﾠdemographic	 ﾠ 
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variables;	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠincome	 ﾠand	 ﾠage	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠused	 ﾠin	 ﾠdetermining	 ﾠ
appropriate	 ﾠ default	 ﾠ rules	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ retirement	 ﾠ plans.	 ﾠ Alternatively,	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
personalized	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠpeople’s	 ﾠown	 ﾠpast	 ﾠchoices	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ extent	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ available.	 ﾠ Indeed,	 ﾠ large	 ﾠ data	 ﾠ sets	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
enlisted	 ﾠto	 ﾠdesign	 ﾠpersonalized	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrules	 ﾠfor	 ﾠindividuals,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
without	 ﾠattention	 ﾠto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠpast	 ﾠchoices.	 ﾠ
An	 ﾠadvantage	 ﾠof	 ﾠpersonalized	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrules	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmay	 ﾠwell	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠ accurate	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ “mass”	 ﾠ default	 ﾠ rules.	 ﾠ As	 ﾠ technology	 ﾠ evolves,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ
should	 ﾠbe	 ﾠincreasingly	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠto	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠpersonalized	 ﾠdefaults,	 ﾠbased	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠ people’s	 ﾠ own	 ﾠ choices	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ situations,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ likely	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ far	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ
accurate	 ﾠthan	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠones.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexcellent	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠuse	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrules	 ﾠto	 ﾠpromote	 ﾠpeople’s	 ﾠwelfare.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsure,	 ﾠany	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
rules	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ respect	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ applicable	 ﾠ laws,	 ﾠ policies,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ regulations	 ﾠ
involving	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠprivacy	 ﾠand	 ﾠshould	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠunduly	 ﾠcrude	 ﾠproxies.	 ﾠ
III.  Requiring	 ﾠActive	 ﾠChoosing	 ﾠ
Sometimes	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ officials	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ outside	 ﾠ observers	 ﾠ do	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ like	 ﾠ
default	 ﾠrules,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠground	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcan	 ﾠstick,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠseen	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
manipulative	 ﾠ (Rebonato	 ﾠ 2012).	 ﾠ We	 ﾠ need	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ learn	 ﾠ much	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ
people’s	 ﾠreactions	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠrules	 ﾠ(Loewenstein	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2014a;	 ﾠBrehm	 ﾠ&	 ﾠ
Brehm	 ﾠ 1981).	 ﾠ To	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ extent	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ concerns	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ warranted,	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ
alternative	 ﾠ approach,	 ﾠ sometimes	 ﾠ worth	 ﾠ serious	 ﾠ consideration,	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
avoid	 ﾠany	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrule	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠactive	 ﾠchoices	 ﾠ(Carroll	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2009,	 ﾠ
Sunstein	 ﾠ2013b).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Under	 ﾠthis	 ﾠapproach,	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠare	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠan	 ﾠactual	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠ
among	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠoptions;	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdefaulted	 ﾠinto	 ﾠany	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠ
alternative.	 ﾠWith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠsavings	 ﾠand	 ﾠhealth	 ﾠcare,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
employer	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ reject	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ opt-ﾭ‐out	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ opt-ﾭ‐in	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ simply	 ﾠ require	 ﾠ
employees	 ﾠto	 ﾠindicate	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpreferences.	 ﾠEvidence	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠactive	 ﾠ
choices	 ﾠresult	 ﾠin	 ﾠfar	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠsavings	 ﾠthan	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrules	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
requires	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠexplicitly	 ﾠto	 ﾠopt	 ﾠin	 ﾠ(Carroll	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠ
There	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ strong	 ﾠ psychological	 ﾠ argument	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ requiring	 ﾠ active	 ﾠ
choosing	 ﾠ(Sunstein	 ﾠ2015a).	 ﾠIf	 ﾠinertia	 ﾠand	 ﾠprocrastination	 ﾠare	 ﾠplaying	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
significant	 ﾠrole,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠactive	 ﾠchoosing	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠthan	 ﾠopt-ﾭ‐in,	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠend	 ﾠup	 ﾠwith	 ﾠoutcomes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠprefer	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
were	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ make	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ choice.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ circumstances,	 ﾠ active	 ﾠ choosing	 ﾠ
increases	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwill	 ﾠend	 ﾠup	 ﾠwith	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpreferred	 ﾠ
outcomes.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ addition,	 ﾠ active	 ﾠ choosers	 ﾠ take	 ﾠ responsibility	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ
choices,	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠmight	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠ(for	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠin	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠthem	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcommitted	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
taking	 ﾠcare	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠhealth)	 ﾠand	 ﾠalso	 ﾠon	 ﾠfamily	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠ(to	 ﾠwhom	 ﾠit	 ﾠ 
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might	 ﾠgreatly	 ﾠmatter,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠend-ﾭ‐of-ﾭ‐life	 ﾠcare,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠ
decision	 ﾠwas	 ﾠmade	 ﾠactively	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠpassively).	 ﾠ
Active	 ﾠchoosing	 ﾠmight	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpreferred	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠofficials	 ﾠlack	 ﾠ
relevant	 ﾠinformation,	 ﾠso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchosen	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrule	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠharmful	 ﾠ
(Rebonato	 ﾠ2011;	 ﾠSunstein	 ﾠ2013b;	 ﾠSunstein	 ﾠ2015a).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠ
important	 ﾠ point.	 ﾠ If	 ﾠ officials	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ inadequately	 ﾠ informed,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
default	 ﾠrule	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠthan	 ﾠa	 ﾠguess,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrule	 ﾠmight	 ﾠlead	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
wrong	 ﾠdirection.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠargues	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrule	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠ
self-ﾭ‐interested	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠhave	 ﾠmanaged	 ﾠto	 ﾠcall	 ﾠfor	 ﾠit,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthough	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhom	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠimposed.	 ﾠPublic	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠ
theorists,	 ﾠemphasizing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠgroups,	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠskeptical	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
official	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrules	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthat	 ﾠreason	 ﾠ(Rebonato	 ﾠ2011).	 ﾠActive	 ﾠchoosing	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠless	 ﾠrisky	 ﾠon	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcounts.	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠ compared	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ either	 ﾠ opt-ﾭ‐in	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ opt-ﾭ‐out,	 ﾠ active	 ﾠ choosing	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠadvantages	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠ
deal	 ﾠof	 ﾠdiversity,	 ﾠso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠis	 ﾠunlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠfit	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠ
circumstances.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠcontexts,	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrule	 ﾠmay	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠharmful,	 ﾠ
because	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠof	 ﾠinertia,	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠforce	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuggestion,	 ﾠmay	 ﾠmean	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
many	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwill	 ﾠend	 ﾠup	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠinterest.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠreason,	 ﾠactive	 ﾠchoosing	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbetter.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
On	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ hand,	 ﾠ active	 ﾠ choosing	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ significant	 ﾠ
disadvantages.	 ﾠA	 ﾠserious	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠsituations	 ﾠof	 ﾠunfamiliarity	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠcomplexity,	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠlack	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠor	 ﾠexperience,	 ﾠ
active	 ﾠchoosing	 ﾠmay	 ﾠimpose	 ﾠunjustified	 ﾠor	 ﾠexcessive	 ﾠburdens	 ﾠ(Thaler	 ﾠ&	 ﾠ
Sunstein	 ﾠ 2008,	 ﾠ Sunstein	 ﾠ 2013b).	 ﾠ These	 ﾠ burdens	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
underestimated;	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcan	 ﾠtake	 ﾠa	 ﾠserious	 ﾠtoll	 ﾠ(Mullainathan	 ﾠand	 ﾠShafir	 ﾠ
2013).	 ﾠThey	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠresources	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
emotion)	 ﾠ required	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ people	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ obtain	 ﾠ relevant	 ﾠ information	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
make	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ choice,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ resources	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ expended	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ
ensuring	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠactually	 ﾠmake	 ﾠit.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠcompared	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrule,	 ﾠ
active	 ﾠchoosing	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠdecisions,	 ﾠpossibly	 ﾠsignificantly.	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ increase	 ﾠ errors,	 ﾠ possibly	 ﾠ significantly,	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ area	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
unfamiliar	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ confusing,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ people	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ choice	 ﾠ poorly.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ
situations,	 ﾠopt-ﾭ‐in	 ﾠor	 ﾠopt-ﾭ‐out	 ﾠmight	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠoutcomes	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpeople.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ private	 ﾠ sector,	 ﾠ default	 ﾠ rules	 ﾠ (for	 ﾠ cell	 ﾠ phones,	 ﾠ computers,	 ﾠ
automobiles,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠmore)	 ﾠare	 ﾠoften	 ﾠin	 ﾠpeople’s	 ﾠinterests,	 ﾠand	 ﾠactive	 ﾠ
choosing	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ impose	 ﾠ unnecessary	 ﾠ burdens.	 ﾠ When	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ officials	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠgood	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠconfidence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrule	 ﾠwill	 ﾠfit	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinformed	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠgroup,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠpromote	 ﾠ
its	 ﾠinterests,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpreferable	 ﾠto	 ﾠselect	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrule	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠactive	 ﾠchoosing	 ﾠ(Sunstein	 ﾠ2015b).	 ﾠPersonalized	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrules,	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠaccuracy,	 ﾠcan	 ﾠhave	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠvirtues	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcount.	 ﾠ 
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IV. Simplification	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
A.	 ﾠComplexity,	 ﾠTake-ﾭ‐Up	 ﾠRates,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBandwidth	 ﾠProblem	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠof	 ﾠpsychological	 ﾠwork	 ﾠdemonstrates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcomplexity	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠhave	 ﾠserious	 ﾠunintended	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠ(including	 ﾠindifference,	 ﾠdelay,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
confusion),	 ﾠ potentially	 ﾠ undermining	 ﾠ policy	 ﾠ goals	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ reducing	 ﾠ
compliance	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ decreasing	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ likelihood	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ people	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ benefit	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠ various	 ﾠ policies	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ programs	 ﾠ (Mullainathan	 ﾠ &	 ﾠ Shafir	 ﾠ 2013).	 ﾠ
Complex	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ especially	 ﾠ harmful	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ count.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ
psychological	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠof	 ﾠcomplexity,	 ﾠin	 ﾠdiscouraging	 ﾠparticipation,	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
often	 ﾠinsufficiently	 ﾠappreciated	 ﾠby	 ﾠpolicymakers,	 ﾠwho	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
achieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsame	 ﾠgoal	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠsimplification	 ﾠas	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠlarge-ﾭ‐scale	 ﾠ
expenditures.	 ﾠ
Consider	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠexamples,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠimplications.	 ﾠ
(1)	 ﾠSimplification	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠform	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠassistance	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcollege	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠeffect,	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠprogram	 ﾠparticipation,	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ significant	 ﾠ boost	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ economic	 ﾠ incentives	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ thousands	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
dollars	 ﾠ(Bettinger	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠ(2)	 ﾠHomeowners	 ﾠcan	 ﾠsave	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
money	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠrefinancing,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates,	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠhave	 ﾠrecently	 ﾠ
lost	 ﾠ$5.4	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠfailure	 ﾠto	 ﾠrefinance,	 ﾠlargely	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
interaction	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ human	 ﾠ psychology	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ relatively	 ﾠ complex	 ﾠ
requirements	 ﾠ(Keys	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2014).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠarea	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠinvolves	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠ
load,	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ imposes	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ kind	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ “bandwidth	 ﾠ tax,”	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ particularly	 ﾠ
harmful	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠon	 ﾠpoor	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠ(Mullainathan	 ﾠ&	 ﾠShafir	 ﾠ2013).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
United	 ﾠStates,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPaperwork	 ﾠReduction	 ﾠAct	 ﾠhas	 ﾠlong	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠdesigned	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
reduce	 ﾠform-ﾭ‐filling	 ﾠburdens,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠpolicymakers	 ﾠare	 ﾠonly	 ﾠstarting	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠconnection	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthose	 ﾠburdens	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbandwidth	 ﾠproblem.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠ
psychologically	 ﾠ informed	 ﾠ policymakers	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ increase	 ﾠ participation	 ﾠ
through	 ﾠ simplification,	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ achieve	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ same	 ﾠ goals	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ could	 ﾠ
otherwise	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ achieved	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ large	 ﾠ expenditures,	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ
evident	 ﾠ attraction	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ simplification	 ﾠ (Mullainathan	 ﾠ &	 ﾠ Shafir	 ﾠ 2013;	 ﾠ
Sunstein	 ﾠ2013a).	 ﾠNote	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠregard	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠstand	 ﾠto	 ﾠgain	 ﾠ
significant	 ﾠ amounts	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ money	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ redeeming	 ﾠ certain	 ﾠ coupons	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ
certificates,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠunrealistically	 ﾠoptimistic	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠwill	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtrouble	 ﾠto	 ﾠmail	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠforms	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠintervention	 ﾠthat	 ﾠappears	 ﾠto	 ﾠwork	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠredemption	 ﾠeasier	 ﾠ
(Letzler	 ﾠand	 ﾠTasoff	 ﾠ2013).	 ﾠAs	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠput	 ﾠit,	 ﾠ“everyone	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
redemption,”	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ whether	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ possibility	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ cashed	 ﾠ out,	 ﾠ so	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
speak,	 ﾠonly	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso	 ﾠ(ibid.).	 ﾠ 
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In	 ﾠ recognition	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ underlying	 ﾠ psychological	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ behavioral	 ﾠ
research,	 ﾠa	 ﾠseries	 ﾠof	 ﾠsteps	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠsimplifying	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFree	 ﾠ
Application	 ﾠfor	 ﾠFederal	 ﾠStudent	 ﾠAid	 ﾠ(FAFSA),	 ﾠreducing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
questions	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ skip	 ﾠ logic	 ﾠ (a	 ﾠ survey	 ﾠ method	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ uses	 ﾠ previous	 ﾠ
responses	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠsubsequent	 ﾠquestions)	 ﾠand	 ﾠallowing	 ﾠelectronic	 ﾠ
retrieval	 ﾠof	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠ(Office	 ﾠof	 ﾠManagement	 ﾠand	 ﾠBudget	 ﾠ2010).	 ﾠUse	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimpler	 ﾠand	 ﾠshorter	 ﾠform	 ﾠis	 ﾠaccompanied	 ﾠby	 ﾠan	 ﾠinitiative	 ﾠto	 ﾠpermit	 ﾠ
online	 ﾠusers	 ﾠto	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠdata	 ﾠpreviously	 ﾠsupplied	 ﾠelectronically	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
tax	 ﾠforms	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠinto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠFAFSA	 ﾠapplications.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
These	 ﾠsteps	 ﾠare	 ﾠintended	 ﾠto	 ﾠsimplify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
financial	 ﾠaid	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠto	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠcollege;	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠgood	 ﾠreason	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠsteps	 ﾠwill	 ﾠenable	 ﾠmany	 ﾠstudents	 ﾠto	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠaid	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
attending	 ﾠcollege	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthey	 ﾠpreviously	 ﾠcould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠFAFSA,	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
great	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠremains	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdone;	 ﾠa	 ﾠvery	 ﾠshort	 ﾠform,	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠjust	 ﾠtwo-ﾭ‐
page,	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsufficient.	 ﾠRelated	 ﾠsteps	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠin	 ﾠmany	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
domains,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠthose	 ﾠdesigned	 ﾠto	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠpoor	 ﾠpeople,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐
intended	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ seemingly	 ﾠ innocuous	 ﾠ paperwork	 ﾠ burdens	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
counterproductive	 ﾠ(Mullainathan	 ﾠ&	 ﾠShafir	 ﾠ2013).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ Department	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Treasury	 ﾠ (2008)	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ launched	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ
important	 ﾠinitiative	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdomain	 ﾠof	 ﾠSocial	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠand	 ﾠSupplemental	 ﾠ
Security	 ﾠIncome:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“Direct	 ﾠExpress”	 ﾠcard	 ﾠprogram.	 ﾠMany	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
now	 ﾠautomatically	 ﾠreceiving	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠvia	 ﾠa	 ﾠprepaid	 ﾠdebit	 ﾠcard.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠ
measure	 ﾠincreases,	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠconvenience	 ﾠand	 ﾠaccuracy,	 ﾠ
thus	 ﾠ reducing	 ﾠ paperwork	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ costs.	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ provides	 ﾠ particular	 ﾠ help	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
those	 ﾠ who	 ﾠ lack	 ﾠ bank	 ﾠ accounts.	 ﾠ Other	 ﾠ programs	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ build	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ
approach	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ considering	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ choice	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ opt-ﾭ‐in	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ opt-ﾭ‐out	 ﾠ
design	 ﾠand	 ﾠsimplifying	 ﾠpeople’s	 ﾠchoices.	 ﾠSome	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠprograms	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
designed	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ help	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ without	 ﾠ bank	 ﾠ accounts,	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ giving	 ﾠ them	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ
accounts	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfunctional	 ﾠequivalent.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ 2011,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Office	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Management	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Budget	 ﾠ drew	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ
psychological	 ﾠ research	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ calling	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ simplification,	 ﾠ focusing	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
particular	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ small	 ﾠ business	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ benefit	 ﾠ programs	 ﾠ (Sunstein	 ﾠ 2011).	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ request	 ﾠ drew	 ﾠ particular	 ﾠ attention	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ potential	 ﾠ harms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
complexity	 ﾠ (in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ context	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ financial	 ﾠ products,	 ﾠ see	 ﾠ Bar-ﾭ‐Gill	 ﾠ 2012),	 ﾠ
noting	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ process	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ renewing	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ applying	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ benefits	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ time-ﾭ‐
consuming,	 ﾠ confusing,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ unnecessarily	 ﾠ complex,	 ﾠ thus	 ﾠ
discouraging	 ﾠ participation	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ undermining	 ﾠ program	 ﾠ goals.	 ﾠ
Sometimes	 ﾠagencies	 ﾠcollect	 ﾠdata	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠunchanged	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠprior	 ﾠ
applications;	 ﾠin	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠcircumstances,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠuse,	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠgive	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoption	 ﾠto	 ﾠuse,	 ﾠpre-ﾭ‐populated	 ﾠelectronic	 ﾠforms	 ﾠ
(Sunstein	 ﾠ2011).	 ﾠ 
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And	 ﾠindeed,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠimperfect	 ﾠtake-ﾭ‐up	 ﾠof	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠ
benefit	 ﾠ programs,	 ﾠ including	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ provide	 ﾠ income	 ﾠ support,	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
partly	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ product	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ behavioral	 ﾠ factors	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ procrastination	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
inertia	 ﾠ(Keys	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2014;	 ﾠcf.	 ﾠLetzler	 ﾠand	 ﾠTasoff	 ﾠ2013,	 ﾠMullainathan	 ﾠ&	 ﾠ
Shafir	 ﾠ 2013).	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ follows	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ efforts	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ increase	 ﾠ simplicity,	 ﾠ including	 ﾠ
automatic	 ﾠenrollment,	 ﾠmay	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsubstantial	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠ(Mullainathan	 ﾠ&	 ﾠ
Shafir	 ﾠ 2013).	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ United	 ﾠ Kingdom,	 ﾠ significant	 ﾠ results	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ
obtained	 ﾠin	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠpayments	 ﾠof	 ﾠfines,	 ﾠlargely	 ﾠby	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠit	 ﾠeasier	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠmore	 ﾠconvenient	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso,	 ﾠand	 ﾠby	 ﾠsending	 ﾠreminders	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
telephone	 ﾠand	 ﾠtext	 ﾠ(Lunn	 ﾠ2014).	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ United	 ﾠ Kingdom’s	 ﾠ Office	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Gas	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Electricity	 ﾠ Markets	 ﾠ
(OFGEM)	 ﾠhas	 ﾠundertaken	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠinitiatives	 ﾠto	 ﾠsimplify	 ﾠregulatory	 ﾠ
burdens	 ﾠon	 ﾠboth	 ﾠindustry	 ﾠand	 ﾠconsumers.	 ﾠAmong	 ﾠthese	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
simplify	 ﾠhow	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠretailers	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠabout	 ﾠrate	 ﾠtariffs	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
consumers,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgoal	 ﾠof	 ﾠenhancing	 ﾠconsumer	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠ(Lunn	 ﾠ2014).	 ﾠ
One	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinitiatives	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaftermath	 ﾠof	 ﾠderegulation	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠmarkets,	 ﾠmany	 ﾠconsumers	 ﾠmade	 ﾠpoor	 ﾠchoices,	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
cases	 ﾠ remained	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ costly	 ﾠ tariffs	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ incumbent	 ﾠ suppliers	 ﾠ (ibid.).	 ﾠ
OFGEM	 ﾠhopes	 ﾠto	 ﾠpromote	 ﾠinformed	 ﾠchoices	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠsimplification.	 ﾠ
B. Structuring	 ﾠChoices	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ traditional	 ﾠ view,	 ﾠ having	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ choices	 ﾠ helps,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ never	 ﾠ
harms,	 ﾠconsumers	 ﾠor	 ﾠprogram	 ﾠparticipants.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠview	 ﾠis	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
reasonable	 ﾠ judgment	 ﾠ that,	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ additional	 ﾠ option	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ better	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ
existing	 ﾠ options,	 ﾠ people	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ simply	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ choose	 ﾠ it.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ general,	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ
choices	 ﾠare	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠdesirable,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠan	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠbody	 ﾠof	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠ
certain	 ﾠ potential	 ﾠ qualifications,	 ﾠ especially	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ unusually	 ﾠ complex	 ﾠ
situations	 ﾠ (Schwartz	 ﾠ 2004;	 ﾠ Sethi-ﾭ‐Iyengar	 ﾠ et	 ﾠ al.	 ﾠ 2004).	 ﾠ For	 ﾠ example,	 ﾠ
there	 ﾠis	 ﾠsome	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠenrollment	 ﾠmay	 ﾠdecline,	 ﾠ(Sethi-ﾭ‐Iyengar	 ﾠet	 ﾠ
al.	 ﾠ 2004),	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ asset	 ﾠ allocations	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ worsen,	 ﾠ (Iyengar	 ﾠ &	 ﾠ Kamenica	 ﾠ
2010)	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmenu	 ﾠof	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠoptions	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠ401(k)	 ﾠplan	 ﾠexpands.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Responding	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠprescription	 ﾠ
drug	 ﾠplans,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠchallenges	 ﾠin	 ﾠprogram	 ﾠselection	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
especially	 ﾠsevere	 ﾠand	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠoverwhelming	 ﾠ(Thaler	 ﾠ&	 ﾠSunstein	 ﾠ2008),	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ United	 ﾠ States	 ﾠ government	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ taken	 ﾠ strong	 ﾠ steps	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ eliminate	 ﾠ
unhelpful	 ﾠand	 ﾠunnecessary	 ﾠcomplexity	 ﾠ(Gruber	 ﾠ&	 ﾠAbaluck	 ﾠ2011).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
Centers	 ﾠfor	 ﾠMedicare	 ﾠand	 ﾠMedicaid	 ﾠServices’	 ﾠMedicare	 ﾠPart	 ﾠD	 ﾠprogram	 ﾠ
rules,	 ﾠ adopted	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ 2011,	 ﾠ require	 ﾠ sponsors	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ ensure	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ when	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ
provide	 ﾠ multiple	 ﾠ plan	 ﾠ offerings,	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ offerings	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ meaningful	 ﾠ
differences.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ rules	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ eliminate	 ﾠ plans	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ persistently	 ﾠ low	 ﾠ
enrollments,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠground	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthose	 ﾠplans	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomplexity	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
choices	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠadding	 ﾠvalue.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠin	 ﾠ 
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these	 ﾠrules	 ﾠwere	 ﾠinformed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠpsychological	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠadverse	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠof	 ﾠcomplexity.	 ﾠ
V.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠSOCIAL	 ﾠNORMS	 ﾠAND	 ﾠCONFORMITY	 ﾠ
Psychologists	 ﾠhave	 ﾠemphasized	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠpractices	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠnorms,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠon	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠdecisions.	 ﾠ
Because	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠof	 ﾠothers	 ﾠas	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ normal	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ appropriate	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ do,	 ﾠ people	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ well	 ﾠ imitate	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
behavior	 ﾠ(Cialdini	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2006).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠfact	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠcan	 ﾠoperate	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
equivalent	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ defaults,	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ observed	 ﾠ choices	 ﾠ spurring	 ﾠ imitative	 ﾠ
behavior	 ﾠ(Huh	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2014).	 ﾠ
If,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠlearn	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠusing	 ﾠmore	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
similarly	 ﾠsituated	 ﾠothers,	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠuse	 ﾠmay	 ﾠdecline—saving	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠ
while	 ﾠalso	 ﾠreducing	 ﾠpollution.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠapplies	 ﾠto	 ﾠhealth-ﾭ‐related	 ﾠ
behavior.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠhas	 ﾠlong	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠare	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
engage	 ﾠin	 ﾠhealthy	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠlive	 ﾠor	 ﾠwork	 ﾠwith	 ﾠothers	 ﾠwho	 ﾠso	 ﾠ
engage.	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠif	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠare	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠwith	 ﾠother	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwho	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
obese,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠobese	 ﾠthemselves.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ behavior	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ relevant	 ﾠ others	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ provide	 ﾠ valuable	 ﾠ information	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠsensible	 ﾠor	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠcourses	 ﾠof	 ﾠaction.	 ﾠInformational	 ﾠcascades	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠa	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠconsequence,	 ﾠas	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠrely	 ﾠon,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠamplify,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
informational	 ﾠ signals	 ﾠ produced	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ actions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ predecessors	 ﾠ
(Hirschleifer	 ﾠ1995).	 ﾠSimilarly,	 ﾠthose	 ﾠactions	 ﾠcan	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠothers	 ﾠwill	 ﾠapprove	 ﾠand	 ﾠdisapprove.	 ﾠ
Psychological	 ﾠ research	 ﾠ suggests	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ efforts	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ use	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ
comparisons	 ﾠcan	 ﾠalter	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠand	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
environmental	 ﾠcosts.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠsector,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠare	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠput	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
creative	 ﾠuse.	 ﾠOpower,	 ﾠan	 ﾠAmerican	 ﾠcompany	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠimpressive	 ﾠuse	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ behavioral	 ﾠ economics,	 ﾠ specializes	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ providing	 ﾠ people	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ
comparisons,	 ﾠ above	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ innovative	 ﾠ Home	 ﾠ Energy	 ﾠ Report.	 ﾠ
Opower’s	 ﾠreports	 ﾠhave	 ﾠhad	 ﾠa	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠeffect.	 ﾠOver	 ﾠfour	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠhouseholds	 ﾠ
now	 ﾠ receive	 ﾠ Home	 ﾠ Energy	 ﾠ Reports,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ saving	 ﾠ people	 ﾠ
hundreds	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ millions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ dollars	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ result.	 ﾠ (See	 ﾠ opower.com	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
details.)	 ﾠThese	 ﾠand	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠinterventions	 ﾠcan	 ﾠsave	 ﾠconsumers	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠ
deal	 ﾠof	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠand	 ﾠalso	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠpollution.	 ﾠ
These	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠhave	 ﾠimplications	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmany	 ﾠdomains.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠ
efforts	 ﾠto	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠtax	 ﾠcollection,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠviolations,	 ﾠcan	 ﾠenlist	 ﾠ
social	 ﾠ norms	 ﾠ (Hallsworth	 ﾠ et	 ﾠ al.	 ﾠ 2014).	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ first	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ two	 ﾠ careful	 ﾠ
experiments	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠU.K.	 ﾠBehavioural	 ﾠInsights	 ﾠTeam,	 ﾠHallsworth	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
his	 ﾠcolleagues	 ﾠsent	 ﾠletters	 ﾠto	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ100,000	 ﾠcitizens	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2011.	 ﾠAll	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ letters	 ﾠ noted	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ recipients	 ﾠ had	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ yet	 ﾠ made	 ﾠ correct	 ﾠ tax	 ﾠ
payments,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ different	 ﾠ versions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ what	 ﾠ followed	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ 
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reminder.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠsaid:	 ﾠ“Nine	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠten	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠpay	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠtaxes	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
time.”	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠversion	 ﾠsaid:	 ﾠ“Nine	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠten	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUK	 ﾠpay	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠtaxes	 ﾠon	 ﾠtime.”	 ﾠThe	 ﾠthird	 ﾠsaid:	 ﾠ“Nine	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠten	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUK	 ﾠ
pay	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠtaxes	 ﾠon	 ﾠtime.	 ﾠYou	 ﾠare	 ﾠcurrently	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠminority	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
people	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnot	 ﾠpaid	 ﾠus	 ﾠyet.”	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfourth	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠ
norms,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠadded	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsentence:	 ﾠ“Paying	 ﾠtax	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠwe	 ﾠall	 ﾠgain	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
vital	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠservices"	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNational	 ﾠHealth	 ﾠService,	 ﾠroads	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
schools.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠletters	 ﾠwere	 ﾠexceedingly	 ﾠeffective.	 ﾠOverall,	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwho	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠletters	 ﾠwere	 ﾠnearly	 ﾠfour	 ﾠtimes	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠpay	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠtax	 ﾠ
bill	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwho	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠletter	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthird:	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
less	 ﾠthan	 ﾠa	 ﾠmonth,	 ﾠit	 ﾠproduced	 ﾠ$3.18	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠin	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠrevenue.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠ letter	 ﾠ had	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ used	 ﾠ across	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ entire	 ﾠ sample,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ
produced	 ﾠan	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠ$18.9	 ﾠmillion.	 ﾠ
Hallsworth	 ﾠand	 ﾠhis	 ﾠcolleagues’	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠexperiment	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠnearly	 ﾠ
120,000	 ﾠtaxpayers	 ﾠand	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠa	 ﾠdozen	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠletters.	 ﾠSome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
letters	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠnorm	 ﾠabout	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠpractices:	 ﾠ“The	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠ
majority	 ﾠof	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUK	 ﾠpay	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠtax	 ﾠon	 ﾠtime.”	 ﾠOther	 ﾠletters	 ﾠwere	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠspecific:	 ﾠ“The	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠmajority	 ﾠof	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠin	 ﾠyour	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠarea	 ﾠpay	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
tax	 ﾠon	 ﾠtime”	 ﾠor	 ﾠ“Most	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠlike	 ﾠyours	 ﾠhave	 ﾠpaid	 ﾠit	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
now.”	 ﾠ
Some	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ letters	 ﾠ referred	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ what	 ﾠ people	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ U.K.	 ﾠ think	 ﾠ
taxpayers	 ﾠshould	 ﾠdo:	 ﾠ“The	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠmajority	 ﾠof	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠagree	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeveryone	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUK	 ﾠshould	 ﾠpay	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠtax	 ﾠon	 ﾠtime,”	 ﾠor	 ﾠ“Nine	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠten	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠagree	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠ everyone	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ UK	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ pay	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ tax	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ time.”	 ﾠ Some	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
letters	 ﾠemphasized	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠcould	 ﾠsave	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠby	 ﾠpaying	 ﾠnow	 ﾠrather	 ﾠ
than	 ﾠlater:	 ﾠ“We	 ﾠare	 ﾠcharging	 ﾠyou	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠamount.”	 ﾠ
With	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ experiment,	 ﾠ Hallsworth	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ his	 ﾠ colleagues	 ﾠ replicated	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠ earlier	 ﾠ finding:	 ﾠ "Norm"	 ﾠ messages	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ large	 ﾠ impact.	 ﾠ Finally,	 ﾠ
highlighting	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ penalty	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ increase	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ time	 ﾠ made	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ
likely	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwould	 ﾠpay.	 ﾠWithin	 ﾠa	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠof	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthree	 ﾠweeks,	 ﾠ
Hallsworth	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ his	 ﾠ colleagues	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ able	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ generate	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ $15.24	 ﾠ
million	 ﾠin	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠtax	 ﾠrevenue.	 ﾠNote	 ﾠthat	 ﾠletters	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsort	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
expensive	 ﾠto	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠand	 ﾠsend,	 ﾠso	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintervention	 ﾠwere	 ﾠ
easily	 ﾠjustified.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠother	 ﾠcontexts,	 ﾠreminders	 ﾠhave	 ﾠhad	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠ
(Lunn	 ﾠ2014);	 ﾠthey	 ﾠappear	 ﾠto	 ﾠwork	 ﾠbest	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠpersonalized	 ﾠ(id.).	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ recent	 ﾠ decades,	 ﾠ smoking	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ seat	 ﾠ belt	 ﾠ regulations	 ﾠ appear	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠ worked	 ﾠ hand	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ hand	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ emerging	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ norms,	 ﾠ helping	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
reduce	 ﾠ deaths	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ injuries.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ context	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ seat	 ﾠ belt	 ﾠ usage	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
United	 ﾠStates,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠa	 ﾠdramatic	 ﾠchange	 ﾠin	 ﾠbehavior,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
increase	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠfew	 ﾠdecades	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠusage	 ﾠrates	 ﾠunder	 ﾠ15	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠto	 ﾠusage	 ﾠ
rates	 ﾠover	 ﾠ70	 ﾠpercent,	 ﾠin	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠpart	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ 
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operated	 ﾠin	 ﾠconcert	 ﾠwith	 ﾠregulatory	 ﾠchanges.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠsome	 ﾠdomains,	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠ
norms	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ helped	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ promote	 ﾠ compliance	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ law	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ without	 ﾠ
active	 ﾠ enforcement.	 ﾠ Public–private	 ﾠ partnerships	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ especially	 ﾠ
important	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ domain,	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ private	 ﾠ sector	 ﾠ emphasize	 ﾠ
norms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠcompliance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠlaw	 ﾠand	 ﾠpromote	 ﾠsafer	 ﾠchoices.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Consider	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ well	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ problem	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ distracted	 ﾠ driving.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ 2009,	 ﾠ
President	 ﾠObama	 ﾠ(2009b)	 ﾠissued	 ﾠan	 ﾠexecutive	 ﾠorder	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbans	 ﾠfederal	 ﾠ
employees	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠtexting	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠdriving.	 ﾠSuch	 ﾠsteps	 ﾠcan	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠpromote	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
social	 ﾠ norm	 ﾠ against	 ﾠ texting	 ﾠ while	 ﾠ driving,	 ﾠ thus	 ﾠ reducing	 ﾠ risks.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ
same	 ﾠapproach—emphasizing	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠnorms—might	 ﾠbe	 ﾠapplied	 ﾠin	 ﾠmany	 ﾠ
domains.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ domain	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ childhood	 ﾠ obesity,	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ example,	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ social	 ﾠ
norm	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ favor	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ healthy	 ﾠ eating	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ proper	 ﾠ exercise	 ﾠ could	 ﾠ produce	 ﾠ
significant	 ﾠ health	 ﾠ benefits.	 ﾠ Here,	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ elsewhere,	 ﾠ public–private	 ﾠ
partnerships	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ play	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ key	 ﾠ role,	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ private	 ﾠ sector	 ﾠ
helping	 ﾠto	 ﾠspur	 ﾠemerging	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpromote	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠchoices	 ﾠby	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
children.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
An	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠand	 ﾠconformity	 ﾠalso	 ﾠhelps	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
explain	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠpolarization,	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠto	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠ
actors	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠkinds.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠpsychologists	 ﾠhave	 ﾠexplored	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
phenomenon	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ “group	 ﾠ polarization,”	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ means	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ people	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
deliberating	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠend	 ﾠup	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠextreme	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠin	 ﾠline	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠpredeliberation	 ﾠtendencies	 ﾠ(Sunstein	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠIf	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠof	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
like-ﾭ‐minded	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠ(say,	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwho	 ﾠare	 ﾠleft	 ﾠof	 ﾠcenter)	 ﾠspeak	 ﾠwith	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
another,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ members	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ another	 ﾠ like-ﾭ‐minded	 ﾠ group	 ﾠ (say,	 ﾠ people	 ﾠ
who	 ﾠare	 ﾠright	 ﾠof	 ﾠcenter)	 ﾠspeak	 ﾠonly	 ﾠwith	 ﾠone	 ﾠanother,	 ﾠsevere	 ﾠdivisions	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexpected.	 ﾠAn	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠpolarization	 ﾠthus	 ﾠcasts	 ﾠ
light	 ﾠon	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠdivisions	 ﾠin	 ﾠmany	 ﾠdemocracies.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠalso	 ﾠhelps	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠ
why	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ groups	 ﾠ become	 ﾠ quite	 ﾠ extreme,	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ prone	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ violence	 ﾠ
(Hardin	 ﾠ2002).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
There	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ implications	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ problem	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ “groupthink,”	 ﾠ
understood	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlight	 ﾠof	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠpsychological	 ﾠfindings,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
show	 ﾠhow	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠcan	 ﾠelicit,	 ﾠor	 ﾠfail	 ﾠto	 ﾠelicit,	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠ
(Sunstein	 ﾠ&	 ﾠHastie	 ﾠ2015).	 ﾠA	 ﾠpressing	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠdevise	 ﾠstrategies,	 ﾠ
especially	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ governments,	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ ensure	 ﾠ against	 ﾠ
polarization	 ﾠand	 ﾠherding	 ﾠ(ibid.).	 ﾠ 
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VII.	 ﾠDISCLOSURE	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
A.  Actually	 ﾠInforming	 ﾠChoice	 ﾠ
1.  Examples.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Many	 ﾠ programs	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ based	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ judgment	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ information	 ﾠ
disclosure	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠregulatory	 ﾠtool,	 ﾠreplacing	 ﾠor	 ﾠcomplementing	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠapproaches.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠmore	 ﾠboth	 ﾠto	 ﾠlearn	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo;	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
area	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠis	 ﾠinadequate,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmany	 ﾠgaps	 ﾠ
remain	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfilled	 ﾠ(Bubb	 ﾠ2014,	 ﾠLoewenstein	 ﾠ2014b).	 ﾠBut	 ﾠin	 ﾠnumerous	 ﾠ
cases,	 ﾠ disclosure	 ﾠ requirements	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ psychologically	 ﾠ informed,	 ﾠ
especially	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠearly	 ﾠ2000s.	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠexamples	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠlegislative	 ﾠ
efforts	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ require	 ﾠ disclosure	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ potential	 ﾠ savings	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ energy	 ﾠ
efficiency	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ information	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ bears	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ health.	 ﾠ Some	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ
initiatives	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ drawn	 ﾠ directly	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ psychology	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ behavioral	 ﾠ
science,	 ﾠ emphasizing	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ importance	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ plain	 ﾠ language,	 ﾠ clarity,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
simplicity,	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠensuring	 ﾠthat	 ﾠany	 ﾠadvice	 ﾠis	 ﾠ“actionable.”	 ﾠ
a)	 ﾠNutrition.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdomain	 ﾠof	 ﾠnutrition,	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠdisclosure	 ﾠ
requirements	 ﾠare	 ﾠin	 ﾠplace.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠtake	 ﾠjust	 ﾠone	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠa	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠrule	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ
issued	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUS	 ﾠDepartment	 ﾠof	 ﾠAgriculture	 ﾠ(USDA),	 ﾠrequiring	 ﾠ
provision	 ﾠof	 ﾠnutritional	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsumers	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠmeat	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠpoultry	 ﾠproducts.	 ﾠNutrition	 ﾠfacts	 ﾠpanels	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
labels	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ products.	 ﾠ Under	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ rule,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ panels	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ contain	 ﾠ
information	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠcalories	 ﾠand	 ﾠboth	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠand	 ﾠsaturated	 ﾠfats	 ﾠ
(9	 ﾠC.F.R.	 ﾠ§	 ﾠ317.309).	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ rule	 ﾠ clearly	 ﾠ recognizes	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ potential	 ﾠ importance	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
psychological	 ﾠphenomenon	 ﾠof	 ﾠframing.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠa	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠlists	 ﾠa	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠ
statement	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠ“80%	 ﾠlean,”	 ﾠit	 ﾠmust	 ﾠalso	 ﾠlist	 ﾠits	 ﾠfat	 ﾠpercentage.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠ
requirement	 ﾠshould	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconfusion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠresult	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠselective	 ﾠ
framing;	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ statement	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ product	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ 80	 ﾠ percent	 ﾠ lean,	 ﾠ standing	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ
itself,	 ﾠ makes	 ﾠ leanness	 ﾠ salient,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ therefore	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ misleading.	 ﾠ As	 ﾠ
noted,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFood	 ﾠand	 ﾠDrug	 ﾠAdministration	 ﾠhas	 ﾠproposed	 ﾠnew	 ﾠrules	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
govern	 ﾠ nutrition	 ﾠ facts	 ﾠ panels,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ rules	 ﾠ explicitly	 ﾠ refer	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
behavioral	 ﾠliterature,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠinforms	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproposals	 ﾠ(US	 ﾠ
FDA	 ﾠ2014a).	 ﾠ
b)	 ﾠ Credit	 ﾠ cards	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ consumer	 ﾠ financial	 ﾠ protection.	 ﾠ Behavioral	 ﾠ
science	 ﾠ played	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ significant	 ﾠ role	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ informing	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Credit	 ﾠ Card	 ﾠ
Accountability,	 ﾠ Responsibility,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Disclosure	 ﾠ Act	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ 2009	 ﾠ (Credit	 ﾠ
CARD	 ﾠAct	 ﾠ2009),	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠdesigned	 ﾠin	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠpart	 ﾠto	 ﾠensure	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcredit	 ﾠ
card	 ﾠusers	 ﾠare	 ﾠadequately	 ﾠinformed.	 ﾠSpecifically,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAct	 ﾠprohibits	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
increase	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ annual	 ﾠ percentage	 ﾠ rates	 ﾠ (APR)	 ﾠ without	 ﾠ forty-ﾭ‐five	 ﾠ days’	 ﾠ
notice,	 ﾠprohibits	 ﾠthe	 ﾠretroactive	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠrate	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠto	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠ 
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balances,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ requires	 ﾠ clear	 ﾠ notice	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ consumer’s	 ﾠ right	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
cancel	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcredit	 ﾠcard	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAPR	 ﾠis	 ﾠraised.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠAct	 ﾠalso	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠelectronic	 ﾠdisclosures	 ﾠof	 ﾠcredit	 ﾠ
card	 ﾠagreements.	 ﾠSpecifically,	 ﾠit	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ(1)	 ﾠ“[e]ach	 ﾠcreditor	 ﾠshall	 ﾠ
establish	 ﾠand	 ﾠmaintain	 ﾠan	 ﾠInternet	 ﾠsite	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcreditor	 ﾠshall	 ﾠpost	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠwritten	 ﾠagreement	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcreditor	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconsumer	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠ
credit	 ﾠ card	 ﾠ account	 ﾠ under	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ open-ﾭ‐end	 ﾠ consumer	 ﾠ credit	 ﾠ plan”;	 ﾠ (2)	 ﾠ
“[e]ach	 ﾠcreditor	 ﾠshall	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBoard,	 ﾠin	 ﾠelectronic	 ﾠformat,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
consumer	 ﾠcredit	 ﾠcard	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠpublishes	 ﾠon	 ﾠits	 ﾠInternet	 ﾠsite”;	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ(3)	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“Board	 ﾠshall	 ﾠestablish	 ﾠand	 ﾠmaintain	 ﾠon	 ﾠits	 ﾠpublicly	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠ
Internet	 ﾠ site	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ central	 ﾠ repository	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ consumer	 ﾠ credit	 ﾠ card	 ﾠ
agreements	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠcreditors	 ﾠpursuant	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsubsection,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠ agreements	 ﾠ shall	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ easily	 ﾠ accessible	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ retrievable	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
public”	 ﾠ(Credit	 ﾠCARD	 ﾠAct	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Evidence	 ﾠ suggests	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Act	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ saved	 ﾠ consumers	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ $12	 ﾠ
billion	 ﾠannually.	 ﾠMoreover,	 ﾠone	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠnudge	 ﾠ–	 ﾠrequiring	 ﾠdisclosure	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠsavings	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠpaying	 ﾠoff	 ﾠbalances	 ﾠin	 ﾠ36	 ﾠmonths	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠ making	 ﾠ minimum	 ﾠ payment	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ saved	 ﾠ consumers	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ $170	 ﾠ
million	 ﾠannually	 ﾠ(Agarwal	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2013).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
More	 ﾠgenerally,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠConsumer	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠProtection	 ﾠBureau	 ﾠhas,	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ central	 ﾠ goals,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ design	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ disclosure	 ﾠ policies	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ
actually	 ﾠinform	 ﾠchoices,	 ﾠas	 ﾠcaptured	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠslogan,	 ﾠ“know	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠyou	 ﾠ
owe.”	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ CFPB	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ taken	 ﾠ steps	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ simplify	 ﾠ disclosure	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ student	 ﾠ
loans,	 ﾠcredit	 ﾠcards,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmortgages.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocess,	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠcareful	 ﾠ
account	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ psychological	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ behavioral	 ﾠ research	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ harmful	 ﾠ
effects	 ﾠof	 ﾠcomplexity	 ﾠ(Lunn	 ﾠ2014).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
c)	 ﾠHealth	 ﾠcare.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠPatient	 ﾠProtection	 ﾠand	 ﾠAffordable	 ﾠCare	 ﾠAct	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
2010	 ﾠ (Affordable	 ﾠ Care	 ﾠ Act)	 ﾠ contains	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ large	 ﾠ number	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ disclosure	 ﾠ
requirements	 ﾠdesigned	 ﾠto	 ﾠpromote	 ﾠaccountability	 ﾠand	 ﾠinformed	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠ respect	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ health	 ﾠ care.	 ﾠ Indeed,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Affordable	 ﾠ Care	 ﾠ Act	 ﾠ is,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
significant	 ﾠpart,	 ﾠa	 ﾠseries	 ﾠof	 ﾠdisclosure	 ﾠrequirements,	 ﾠmany	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
meant	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ inform	 ﾠ consumers,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ do	 ﾠ so	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ alert	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
psychological	 ﾠ findings.	 ﾠ Under	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Act,	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ restaurant	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ part	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
chain	 ﾠwith	 ﾠtwenty	 ﾠor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlocations	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠbusiness	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠ
name	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ required	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ disclose	 ﾠ calories	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ menu	 ﾠ board	 ﾠ (on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
empirical	 ﾠcomplexities	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmixed	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠsee	 ﾠLoewenstein	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ
2014b).	 ﾠSuch	 ﾠrestaurants	 ﾠare	 ﾠalso	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠwritten	 ﾠform	 ﾠ
(available	 ﾠto	 ﾠcustomers	 ﾠupon	 ﾠrequest)	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠnutrition	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠ
pertaining	 ﾠto	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠcalories	 ﾠand	 ﾠcalories	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠfat,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠamounts	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
fat,	 ﾠ saturated	 ﾠ fat,	 ﾠ cholesterol,	 ﾠ sodium,	 ﾠ total	 ﾠ carbohydrates,	 ﾠ complex	 ﾠ
carbohydrates,	 ﾠsugars,	 ﾠdietary	 ﾠfiber,	 ﾠand	 ﾠprotein	 ﾠ(Affordable	 ﾠCare	 ﾠAct	 ﾠ
2010).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 
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In	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ similar	 ﾠ vein,	 ﾠ §	 ﾠ 1103	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Act	 ﾠ calls	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ “[i]mmediate	 ﾠ
information	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ allows	 ﾠ consumers	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ identify	 ﾠ affordable	 ﾠ coverage	 ﾠ
options.”	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ requires	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ establishment	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ internet	 ﾠ portal	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
beneficiaries	 ﾠto	 ﾠeasily	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠaffordable	 ﾠand	 ﾠcomprehensive	 ﾠcoverage	 ﾠ
options,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠabout	 ﾠeligibility,	 ﾠavailability,	 ﾠpremium	 ﾠ
rates,	 ﾠcost	 ﾠsharing,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠof	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠpremium	 ﾠrevenues	 ﾠspent	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠhealth	 ﾠcare,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠadministrative	 ﾠexpenses.	 ﾠ
Implementing	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ provision	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Affordable	 ﾠ Care	 ﾠ Act,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
Department	 ﾠof	 ﾠHealth	 ﾠand	 ﾠHuman	 ﾠServices	 ﾠ(HHS)	 ﾠfinalized	 ﾠa	 ﾠrule	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
require	 ﾠ insurance	 ﾠ companies	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ provide	 ﾠ clear,	 ﾠ plain	 ﾠ language	 ﾠ
summaries	 ﾠof	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠto	 ﾠprospective	 ﾠcustomers.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠrule	 ﾠ
includes	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠinformation,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠannual	 ﾠpremium,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠannual	 ﾠ
deductible,	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ statement	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ services	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ covered,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
statement	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ costs	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ going	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ out-ﾭ‐of-ﾭ‐network	 ﾠ provider	 ﾠ
(Healthcare.gov	 ﾠ2011).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
d)	 ﾠSmart	 ﾠdisclosure.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates,	 ﾠpsychologically	 ﾠinformed	 ﾠ
initiatives	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ focused	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ idea	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ “smart	 ﾠ disclosure,”	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
designed	 ﾠto	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠconsumers	 ﾠknow	 ﾠabout	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠchoices	 ﾠ(Kamenica	 ﾠ
et	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2011).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠidea	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠcostly	 ﾠfor	 ﾠconsumers	 ﾠto	 ﾠobtain	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠ information,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ part	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ result	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ inertia,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ hence	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
information	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ made	 ﾠ available	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ downloadable,	 ﾠ machine-ﾭ‐
readable	 ﾠformats	 ﾠ(Sunstein	 ﾠ2011).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠKingdom,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“midata”	 ﾠ
initiative	 ﾠaspires	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠconsumers	 ﾠmore	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠconsumption	 ﾠ
data,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgoal	 ﾠof	 ﾠallowing	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic,	 ﾠamong	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
things,	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ analyze	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ data	 ﾠ via	 ﾠ software	 ﾠ applications	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ use	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
improve	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ decision-ﾭ‐making	 ﾠ (Lunn	 ﾠ 2014;	 ﾠ
https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/providing-ﾭ‐better-ﾭ‐
information-ﾭ‐and-ﾭ‐protection-ﾭ‐for-ﾭ‐consumers/supporting-ﾭ‐
pages/personal-ﾭ‐data).	 ﾠUnder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEnterprise	 ﾠand	 ﾠRegulatory	 ﾠReform	 ﾠAct	 ﾠ
2013,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ government	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ authority	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ compel	 ﾠ businesses	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
release	 ﾠ consumer	 ﾠ data;	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ date	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ done,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠis	 ﾠhoping	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbusinesses	 ﾠto	 ﾠrelease	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠdata	 ﾠvoluntarily.	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠclear	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthis	 ﾠbrief	 ﾠsurvey	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠ
disclosure	 ﾠ requirements	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ very	 ﾠ wide.	 ﾠ Such	 ﾠ approaches	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ
considerable	 ﾠpromise,	 ﾠthough	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubstantial	 ﾠdegree,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjury	 ﾠis	 ﾠstill	 ﾠ
out	 ﾠon	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠ(Bubb	 ﾠ2014,	 ﾠLoewenstein	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2014b).	 ﾠ
2.  How,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠwhether.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠpsychologists	 ﾠhave	 ﾠemphasized,	 ﾠdisclosure	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
enough;	 ﾠregulators	 ﾠshould	 ﾠdevote	 ﾠcare	 ﾠand	 ﾠattention	 ﾠto	 ﾠhow,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
whether,	 ﾠ disclosure	 ﾠ occurs	 ﾠ (Loewenstein	 ﾠ et	 ﾠ al.	 ﾠ 2014b).	 ﾠ Clarity	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
simplicity	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ often	 ﾠ critical.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ cases,	 ﾠ accurate	 ﾠ disclosure	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ 
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information	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠineffective	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠis	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠabstract,	 ﾠvague,	 ﾠ
detailed,	 ﾠ complex,	 ﾠ poorly	 ﾠ framed,	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ overwhelming	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ useful.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ
addition,	 ﾠemphasis	 ﾠon	 ﾠ certain	 ﾠ variables	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ attract	 ﾠ undue	 ﾠ attention	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ prove	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ misleading.	 ﾠ If	 ﾠ disclosure	 ﾠ requirements	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
helpful,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdesigned	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsensitive	 ﾠto	 ﾠhow	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠactually	 ﾠ
process	 ﾠinformation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠ good	 ﾠ rule	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ thumb	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ disclosure	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ concrete,	 ﾠ
straightforward,	 ﾠsimple,	 ﾠmeaningful,	 ﾠtimely,	 ﾠand	 ﾠsalient.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgoal	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
inform	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhow	 ﾠto	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠrisks	 ﾠor	 ﾠto	 ﾠobtain	 ﾠbenefits,	 ﾠdisclosure	 ﾠ
should	 ﾠ avoid	 ﾠ abstract	 ﾠ statements	 ﾠ (such	 ﾠ as,	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ example,	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ “healthy	 ﾠ
eating”	 ﾠor	 ﾠ“good	 ﾠdiet”)	 ﾠand	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠidentify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsteps	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmight	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠto	 ﾠobtain	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠgoal	 ﾠ(by	 ﾠspecifying,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠ
specific	 ﾠ actions	 ﾠ parents	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ take	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ reduce	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ risk	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ childhood	 ﾠ
obesity).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ2010,	 ﾠHHS	 ﾠemphasized	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠof	 ﾠclarity	 ﾠand	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠ
accessibility	 ﾠin	 ﾠconnection	 ﾠwith	 ﾠits	 ﾠinterim	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠrule	 ﾠentitled	 ﾠ“Health	 ﾠ
Care	 ﾠReform	 ﾠInsurance	 ﾠWeb	 ﾠPortal	 ﾠRequirements,”	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ“adopts	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
categories	 ﾠof	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcollected	 ﾠand	 ﾠdisplayed	 ﾠas	 ﾠWeb	 ﾠ
portal	 ﾠcontent,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdata	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwill	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠissuers	 ﾠand	 ﾠrequest	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠStates,	 ﾠassociations,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠpools	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠcreate	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
content”	 ﾠ(US	 ﾠDep.	 ﾠHHS	 ﾠ2010).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpreamble	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterim	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠrule	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
behaviorally	 ﾠinformed	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠresponsive	 ﾠto	 ﾠhow	 ﾠ
people	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠinformation:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠimplementing	 ﾠthese	 ﾠrequirements,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠseek	 ﾠto	 ﾠdevelop	 ﾠa	 ﾠWeb	 ﾠ
site	 ﾠ (hereinafter	 ﾠ called	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Web	 ﾠ portal)	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ empower	 ﾠ
consumers	 ﾠby	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠinformed	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠand	 ﾠpromoting	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠ
competition.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠachieve	 ﾠthese	 ﾠends,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠintend	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠa	 ﾠWeb	 ﾠ
portal	 ﾠthat	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsumers	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠclear,	 ﾠsalient,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ easily	 ﾠ navigated	 ﾠ manner.	 ﾠ We	 ﾠ plan	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ minimize	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ use	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
technical	 ﾠ language,	 ﾠ jargon,	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ excessive	 ﾠ complexity	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ order	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
promote	 ﾠthe	 ﾠability	 ﾠof	 ﾠconsumers	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠact	 ﾠin	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠlearned.	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ[W]e	 ﾠplan	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ provide	 ﾠ information,	 ﾠ consistent	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ applicable	 ﾠ laws,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
format	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ accessible	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ use	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ members	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ public,	 ﾠ
allowing	 ﾠ them	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ download	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ repackage	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ information,	 ﾠ
promoting	 ﾠinnovation	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgoal	 ﾠof	 ﾠconsumer	 ﾠchoice.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
That	 ﾠweb	 ﾠportal	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfound	 ﾠat	 ﾠhttp://www.healthcare.gov/.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
If	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ carefully	 ﾠ designed,	 ﾠ disclosure	 ﾠ requirements	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ produce	 ﾠ
ineffective,	 ﾠ confusing,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ potentially	 ﾠ misleading	 ﾠ messages.	 ﾠ
Psychologically	 ﾠinformed	 ﾠapproaches	 ﾠare	 ﾠalert	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠand	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠ
possible	 ﾠ improvements.	 ﾠ For	 ﾠ instance,	 ﾠ automobile	 ﾠ manufacturers	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ 
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currently	 ﾠ required	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ disclose	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ fuel	 ﾠ economy	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ new	 ﾠ vehicles	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ
measured	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ miles	 ﾠ per	 ﾠ gallon	 ﾠ (MPG).	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ disclosure	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ useful	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
consumers	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ helps	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ promote	 ﾠ informed	 ﾠ choice.	 ﾠ As	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
Environmental	 ﾠ Protection	 ﾠ Agency	 ﾠ (EPA)	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ emphasized,	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠ
MPG	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠnonlinear	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠof	 ﾠfuel	 ﾠconsumption	 ﾠ(US	 ﾠEPA	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠFor	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
fixed	 ﾠtravel	 ﾠdistance,	 ﾠa	 ﾠchange	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ20	 ﾠto	 ﾠ25	 ﾠMPG	 ﾠproduces	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠ
reduction	 ﾠin	 ﾠfuel	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠthan	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠa	 ﾠchange	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ30	 ﾠto	 ﾠ35	 ﾠMPG,	 ﾠor	 ﾠeven	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠ30	 ﾠto	 ﾠ38	 ﾠMPG.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠsee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdramatically,	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
fact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠan	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ10	 ﾠto	 ﾠ20	 ﾠMPG	 ﾠproduces	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsavings	 ﾠthan	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
increase	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ 20	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ 40	 ﾠ MPG,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ increase	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ 10	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ 11	 ﾠ MPG	 ﾠ
produces	 ﾠsavings	 ﾠalmost	 ﾠas	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ34	 ﾠto	 ﾠ50	 ﾠMPG.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Evidence	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmany	 ﾠconsumers	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
point	 ﾠand	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠinterpret	 ﾠMPG	 ﾠas	 ﾠlinear	 ﾠwith	 ﾠfuel	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠLarrick	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ Soll	 ﾠ 2008).	 ﾠ When	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ occurs,	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ error	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ likely	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ produce	 ﾠ
inadequately	 ﾠinformed	 ﾠpurchasing	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠare	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠ
comparative	 ﾠjudgments	 ﾠabout	 ﾠfuel	 ﾠcosts.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠmay	 ﾠwell	 ﾠ
underestimate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrading	 ﾠa	 ﾠlow	 ﾠMPG	 ﾠcar	 ﾠfor	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
even	 ﾠ slightly	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ fuel	 ﾠ efficient.	 ﾠ By	 ﾠ contrast,	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ alternative	 ﾠ fuel	 ﾠ
economy	 ﾠmetric,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠgallons	 ﾠper	 ﾠmile,	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfar	 ﾠless	 ﾠconfusing.	 ﾠ
Such	 ﾠa	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠis	 ﾠlinear	 ﾠwith	 ﾠfuel	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠand	 ﾠhence	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠa	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠ
way	 ﾠto	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠconsumers	 ﾠmake	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠchoices.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠ closely	 ﾠ related	 ﾠ finding	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ because	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ MPG	 ﾠ illusion,	 ﾠ
consumers	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderestimate	 ﾠ the	 ﾠcost	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠlow-ﾭ‐
MPG	 ﾠvehicles	 ﾠand	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠoverestimate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcost	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
high-ﾭ‐MPG	 ﾠvehicles	 ﾠ(Allcott	 ﾠ2011).	 ﾠRecognizing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimperfections	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
potentially	 ﾠmisleading	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMPG	 ﾠmeasure,	 ﾠand	 ﾠreferring	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
psychological	 ﾠ literature,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Department	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Transportation	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ EPA	 ﾠ
proposed	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ 2009	 ﾠ two	 ﾠ alternative	 ﾠ labels	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ meant	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ provide	 ﾠ
consumers	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ clearer	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ accurate	 ﾠ information	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
effects	 ﾠof	 ﾠfuel	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠon	 ﾠfuel	 ﾠexpenses	 ﾠand	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠenvironment	 ﾠ(US	 ﾠ
EPA	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠ
After	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ period	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ comment,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Department	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
Transportation	 ﾠand	 ﾠEPA	 ﾠultimately	 ﾠchose	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠlabel	 ﾠto	 ﾠrespond	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
psychological	 ﾠand	 ﾠbehavioral	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠ(US	 ﾠEPA	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠ
calls	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdisclosure	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfactual	 ﾠmaterial	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠoption	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠadds	 ﾠa	 ﾠclear	 ﾠstatement	 ﾠabout	 ﾠanticipated	 ﾠfuel	 ﾠsavings	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠcosts)	 ﾠ
over	 ﾠa	 ﾠfive-ﾭ‐year	 ﾠperiod.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠstatement	 ﾠof	 ﾠfuel	 ﾠsavings	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠcosts)	 ﾠshould	 ﾠ
simultaneously	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠcounteract	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMPG	 ﾠillusion	 ﾠand	 ﾠinform	 ﾠconsumers	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠof	 ﾠfuel	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠover	 ﾠa	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠtime	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠ(US	 ﾠ
EPA	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠa	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠvein,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUSDA	 ﾠhas	 ﾠabandoned	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“Food	 ﾠPyramid,”	 ﾠ
used	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdecades	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠicon	 ﾠto	 ﾠpromote	 ﾠhealthy	 ﾠeating.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ 
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Pyramid	 ﾠhas	 ﾠlong	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠcriticized	 ﾠas	 ﾠinsufficiently	 ﾠinformative;	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwith	 ﾠany	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠclear	 ﾠ“path”	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠhealthy	 ﾠ
diet.	 ﾠ According	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ critical	 ﾠ account,	 ﾠ “its	 ﾠ meaning	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ almost	 ﾠ
completely	 ﾠopaque.	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠlearn	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFood	 ﾠPyramid	 ﾠhas	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠfood,	 ﾠyou	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠwilling	 ﾠto	 ﾠdecipher	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPyramid’s	 ﾠmarkings.	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ language	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ concepts	 ﾠ here	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ so	 ﾠ hopelessly	 ﾠ abstracted	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ
people’s	 ﾠactual	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠwith	 ﾠfood	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ.	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmessage	 ﾠconfuses	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
demoralizes	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ“	 ﾠ(Heath	 ﾠ&	 ﾠHeath	 ﾠ2010).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Aware	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ objections,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ after	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ extended	 ﾠ period	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
deliberation,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ USDA	 ﾠ (2011b)	 ﾠ replaced	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Pyramid	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ new,	 ﾠ
simpler	 ﾠicon	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠFood	 ﾠPlate),	 ﾠconsisting	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠplate	 ﾠwith	 ﾠclear	 ﾠmarkings	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠfruit,	 ﾠvegetable,	 ﾠgrains,	 ﾠand	 ﾠprotein.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠFood	 ﾠPlate	 ﾠis	 ﾠaccompanied	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠstraightforward	 ﾠguidance,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠ“make	 ﾠhalf	 ﾠyour	 ﾠplate	 ﾠfruits	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
vegetables,”	 ﾠ“drink	 ﾠwater	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠof	 ﾠsugary	 ﾠdrinks,”	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“switch	 ﾠto	 ﾠfat-ﾭ‐
free	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ low-ﾭ‐fat	 ﾠ (1%)	 ﾠ milk.”	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ approach	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ key	 ﾠ advantage	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
informing	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo,	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠseek	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠhealthier	 ﾠdiet.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcircumstances,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtendency	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠunrealistic	 ﾠoptimism	 ﾠ
(Sharot	 ﾠ 2011	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Bar-ﾭ‐Gill	 ﾠ 2012)	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ lead	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ consumers	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
downplay	 ﾠor	 ﾠneglect	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠabout	 ﾠstatistical	 ﾠrisks	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠ product	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ activity.	 ﾠ Possible	 ﾠ examples	 ﾠ include	 ﾠ smoking	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
distracted	 ﾠdriving.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠcircumstances,	 ﾠdisclosure	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdesigned	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠmake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisks	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠless	 ﾠabstract,	 ﾠmore	 ﾠvivid,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠsalient.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFamily	 ﾠSmoking	 ﾠPrevention	 ﾠand	 ﾠTobacco	 ﾠ
Control	 ﾠ Act	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ 2009
\	 ﾠ (Smoking	 ﾠ Prevention	 ﾠ Act)	 ﾠ requires	 ﾠ graphic	 ﾠ
warnings	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisks	 ﾠof	 ﾠsmoking	 ﾠtobacco,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFood	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠDrug	 ﾠAdministration	 ﾠ(FDA)	 ﾠhas	 ﾠfinalized	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠwarnings	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
comment,	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ vivid	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ disturbing	 ﾠ pictures	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
adverse	 ﾠoutcomes	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsmoking.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcompulsory	 ﾠwarnings	 ﾠ
were	 ﾠ invalidated	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ court	 ﾠ (on	 ﾠ free	 ﾠ speech	 ﾠ grounds),	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠhas	 ﾠissued	 ﾠgraphic	 ﾠwarnings	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠown,	 ﾠvery	 ﾠpossibly	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
significant	 ﾠeffects.	 ﾠ
B.  Psychology,	 ﾠSpurring	 ﾠCompetition	 ﾠ
If	 ﾠdisclosure	 ﾠrequirements	 ﾠ are	 ﾠstraightforward	 ﾠand	 ﾠsimple,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
should	 ﾠfacilitate	 ﾠcomparison	 ﾠshopping	 ﾠand	 ﾠhence	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠcompetition.	 ﾠ
Drawing	 ﾠon	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠscience	 ﾠresearch,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTreasury	 ﾠDepartment’s	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ financial	 ﾠ regulation	 ﾠ emphasizes	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ value	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ requiring	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
“communications	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ consumer	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ reasonable,	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ merely	 ﾠ
technically	 ﾠ compliant	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ non-ﾭ‐deceptive.	 ﾠ Reasonableness	 ﾠ includes	 ﾠ
balance	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresentation	 ﾠof	 ﾠrisks	 ﾠand	 ﾠbenefits,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠclarity	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
conspicuousness	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ description	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ significant	 ﾠ product	 ﾠ costs	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ 
 
  28 
risks”	 ﾠ(US	 ﾠDep.	 ﾠTreasury	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdepartment’s	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠgoes	 ﾠon	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
say	 ﾠthat	 ﾠone	 ﾠgoal	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
harness	 ﾠ technology	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ make	 ﾠ disclosures	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ dynamic	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
adaptable	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneeds	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠconsumer.	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ.	 ﾠDisclosures	 ﾠ
should	 ﾠ show	 ﾠ consumers	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ consequences	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ financial	 ﾠ
decisions.	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ[The	 ﾠregulator]	 ﾠshould	 ﾠ[	 ﾠ]	 ﾠmandate	 ﾠor	 ﾠencourage	 ﾠ
calculator	 ﾠ disclosures	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ mortgages	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ assist	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ comparison	 ﾠ
shopping.	 ﾠ For	 ﾠ example,	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ calculator	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ shows	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ costs	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
mortgage	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconsumer’s	 ﾠexpectations	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhow	 ﾠlong	 ﾠshe	 ﾠ
will	 ﾠ stay	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ home	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ reveal	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ significant	 ﾠ difference	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠ two	 ﾠ products	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ appears	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ standard	 ﾠ paper	 ﾠ
disclosures	 ﾠ(US	 ﾠDep.	 ﾠTreasury	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ keeping	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ theme,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Consumer	 ﾠ Financial	 ﾠ Protection	 ﾠ
Bureau	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ authorized	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ ensure	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ “consumers	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ provided	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ
timely	 ﾠand	 ﾠunderstandable	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠ financial	 ﾠ transactions”	 ﾠ (Dodd-ﾭ‐Frank	 ﾠ Act	 ﾠ 2010).	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ Bureau	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠ authorized	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ issue	 ﾠ rules	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ ensure	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ information	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ “fully,	 ﾠ
accurately,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ effectively	 ﾠ disclosed	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ consumers	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ manner	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
permits	 ﾠ consumers	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ understand	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ costs,	 ﾠ benefits,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ risks	 ﾠ
associated	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ product	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ service,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ light	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ facts	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
circumstances”	 ﾠ(Dodd-ﾭ‐Frank	 ﾠAct	 ﾠ2010).	 ﾠ
To	 ﾠaccomplish	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtask,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBureau	 ﾠis	 ﾠauthorized	 ﾠto	 ﾠissue	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠ
forms	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ“a	 ﾠclear	 ﾠand	 ﾠconspicuous	 ﾠdisclosure	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠminimum—
(A)	 ﾠuses	 ﾠplain	 ﾠlanguage	 ﾠcomprehensible	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsumers;	 ﾠ(B)	 ﾠcontains	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
clear	 ﾠformat	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesign,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠeasily	 ﾠreadable	 ﾠtype	 ﾠfont;	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(C)	 ﾠ
succinctly	 ﾠexplains	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcommunicated	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
consumer”	 ﾠ (Dodd-ﾭ‐Frank	 ﾠ Act	 ﾠ 2010).	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ addition,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ director	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
Bureau	 ﾠis	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“establish	 ﾠa	 ﾠunit	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠfunctions	 ﾠshall	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠ
researching,	 ﾠ analyzing,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ reporting	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ .	 ﾠ .	 ﾠ .	 ﾠ consumer	 ﾠ awareness,	 ﾠ
understanding,	 ﾠand	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠdisclosures	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommunications	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠ
consumer	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠproducts	 ﾠor	 ﾠservices”	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“consumer	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
respect	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ consumer	 ﾠ financial	 ﾠ products	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ services,	 ﾠ including	 ﾠ
performance	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ mortgage	 ﾠ loans”	 ﾠ (Dodd-ﾭ‐Frank	 ﾠ Act	 ﾠ 2010).	 ﾠ Note	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
new	 ﾠtechnologies	 ﾠmake	 ﾠit	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠto	 ﾠinform	 ﾠconsumers	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠ
choices	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ usages,	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ approach	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ especially	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ
when	 ﾠ firms	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ better	 ﾠ information	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ consumers	 ﾠ do	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ
choices	 ﾠand	 ﾠusages.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠvein,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDepartment	 ﾠof	 ﾠLabor	 ﾠissued	 ﾠa	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠ
rule	 ﾠrequiring	 ﾠdisclosure	 ﾠto	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠof	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠin	 ﾠpension	 ﾠ
plans.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ rule	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ designed	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ require	 ﾠ clear,	 ﾠ simple	 ﾠ disclosure	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
information	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ fees	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ expenses	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ allow	 ﾠ meaningful	 ﾠ 
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comparisons,	 ﾠin	 ﾠpart	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠmethodologies	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
calculation	 ﾠand	 ﾠdisclosure	 ﾠof	 ﾠexpense	 ﾠand	 ﾠreturn	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠ(29	 ﾠC.F.R.	 ﾠ
§	 ﾠ2550.404a-ﾭ‐5).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Yet	 ﾠanother	 ﾠexample	 ﾠis	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠrule	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDepartment	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠEducation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpromotes	 ﾠtransparency	 ﾠand	 ﾠconsumer	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
respect	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ for-ﾭ‐profit	 ﾠ education	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ requiring	 ﾠ institutions	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ provide	 ﾠ
clear	 ﾠdisclosure	 ﾠof	 ﾠcosts,	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠlevels,	 ﾠgraduation	 ﾠrates,	 ﾠand	 ﾠplacement	 ﾠ
rates	 ﾠ (US	 ﾠ Dep.	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Education	 ﾠ 2010a).	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ rule	 ﾠ states	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ relevant	 ﾠ
institutions	 ﾠmust	 ﾠdisclose,	 ﾠamong	 ﾠother	 ﾠthings,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoccupations	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
program	 ﾠprepares	 ﾠstudents	 ﾠto	 ﾠenter,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠon-ﾭ‐time	 ﾠgraduation	 ﾠrate	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
students	 ﾠ completing	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ program,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ tuition	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ fees	 ﾠ charged	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
students	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ completing	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ program	 ﾠ within	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ normal	 ﾠ time,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
placement	 ﾠrate	 ﾠfor	 ﾠstudents	 ﾠcompleting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprogram,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmedian	 ﾠ
loan	 ﾠ debt	 ﾠ incurred	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ students	 ﾠ who	 ﾠ completed	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ program.	 ﾠ These	 ﾠ
disclosures	 ﾠ must	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ included	 ﾠ “in	 ﾠ promotional	 ﾠ materials	 ﾠ [the	 ﾠ
institution]	 ﾠ makes	 ﾠ available	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ prospective	 ﾠ students”	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
“[p]rominently	 ﾠprovide[d]	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ.	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠand	 ﾠmeaningful	 ﾠmanner	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠhome	 ﾠpage	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠprogram	 ﾠWeb	 ﾠsite”	 ﾠ(34	 ﾠC.F.R.	 ﾠ§	 ﾠ668.6;	 ﾠUS	 ﾠDep.	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Education,	 ﾠ2010b).	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠnoted,	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠof	 ﾠwork	 ﾠremains	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdone	 ﾠon	 ﾠdisclosure	 ﾠ
polices	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠ(Bubb	 ﾠ
2014).	 ﾠBut	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠclear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠattuned	 ﾠto	 ﾠhow	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠ
information,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠfar	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠsucceed	 ﾠthan	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
(ibid.;	 ﾠLoewenstein	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2014b).	 ﾠ
VI.	 ﾠATTENTION	 ﾠAND	 ﾠCOGNITIVE	 ﾠACCESSIBILITY	 ﾠ
Psychological	 ﾠ research	 ﾠ suggests	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ often	 ﾠ possible	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
promote	 ﾠ policy	 ﾠ goals	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ triggering	 ﾠ people’s	 ﾠ attention	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ making	 ﾠ
certain	 ﾠ features	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ product	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ situation	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ accessible	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
consumers.	 ﾠ As	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ simple	 ﾠ example	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ importance	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ cognitive	 ﾠ
accessibility,	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠalcohol	 ﾠtaxes.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
taxes	 ﾠare	 ﾠspecifically	 ﾠidentified	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠposted	 ﾠprice,	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠin	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
taxes	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠon	 ﾠalcohol	 ﾠconsumption	 ﾠthan	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠare	 ﾠapplied	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠregister	 ﾠ(Chetty	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2009;	 ﾠFinkelstein	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠ
Of	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠincentives	 ﾠmatter,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠmatter,	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠ
must	 ﾠpay	 ﾠattention	 ﾠto	 ﾠthem	 ﾠ(Dolan	 ﾠ2014).	 ﾠSensible	 ﾠpolicies,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠ
those	 ﾠthat	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠdisclosure,	 ﾠare	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠattentive	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
cognitive	 ﾠaccessibility.	 ﾠ
With	 ﾠ respect	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ smoking	 ﾠ prevention,	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ example,	 ﾠ triggering	 ﾠ
attention	 ﾠto	 ﾠadverse	 ﾠhealth	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠpurpose	 ﾠof	 ﾠdisclosure	 ﾠ
requirements.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ context	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ smoking,	 ﾠ graphic	 ﾠ warnings	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ
designed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠimmediately	 ﾠaccessible.	 ﾠSimilarly,	 ﾠOSHA	 ﾠhas	 ﾠissued	 ﾠa	 ﾠ 
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regulation	 ﾠrequiring	 ﾠchemical	 ﾠmanufacturers	 ﾠand	 ﾠimporters	 ﾠto	 ﾠprepare	 ﾠ
labels	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ hazardous	 ﾠ chemicals	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ include	 ﾠ pictograms	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ signal	 ﾠ
words	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠeasily	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠby	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠ(29	 ﾠC.F.R.	 ﾠ§§	 ﾠ1910,	 ﾠ
1915,	 ﾠ1926).	 ﾠWell-ﾭ‐designed	 ﾠlabels	 ﾠtrigger	 ﾠattention;	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmake	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠ
factors	 ﾠ salient	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ who	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ see	 ﾠ them.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ significant	 ﾠ
consequences	 ﾠof	 ﾠconvenience	 ﾠ(return	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠissue	 ﾠof	 ﾠobesity)	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
seen	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠclose	 ﾠcousin	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠaccessibility	 ﾠeffects.	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠ similar	 ﾠ point	 ﾠ applies	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ domain	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ energy	 ﾠ efficiency.	 ﾠ For	 ﾠ
many	 ﾠ consumers,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ potential	 ﾠ savings	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ energy-ﾭ‐efficient	 ﾠ products	 ﾠ
may	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠvisible	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime	 ﾠof	 ﾠpurchase,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠthose	 ﾠsavings	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
significant.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ “Energy	 ﾠ Paradox”	 ﾠ refers	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ fact	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ
consumers	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠpurchase	 ﾠenergy-ﾭ‐efficient	 ﾠproducts	 ﾠeven	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
clearly	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso.	 ﾠEmpirical	 ﾠwork	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠnonprice	 ﾠinterventions,	 ﾠby	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠof	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠuse	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
accessible,	 ﾠcan	 ﾠalter	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠand	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠelectricity	 ﾠuse	 ﾠ
There	 ﾠis	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠinterventions	 ﾠcan	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
public	 ﾠsavings	 ﾠ(Howarth	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2000).	 ﾠConsider,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠare	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠvisible	 ﾠonly	 ﾠonce	 ﾠa	 ﾠmonth,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠ presented	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ bill.	 ﾠ Efforts	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ increase	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ cognitive	 ﾠ
accessibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠcosts,	 ﾠby	 ﾠdisplaying	 ﾠthem	 ﾠin	 ﾠreal	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠcan	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠ
significant	 ﾠsavings,	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠ related	 ﾠ approach	 ﾠ attempts	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ identify	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ refocus	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ frame	 ﾠ
through	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠinterpret	 ﾠinformation.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠsome	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ consumers	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ seriously	 ﾠ consider	 ﾠ annuities	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
retirement	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ insure	 ﾠ against	 ﾠ longevity	 ﾠ risk—the	 ﾠ risk	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ
outlive	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠassets—because	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfully	 ﾠappreciate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠ
advantages	 ﾠof	 ﾠannuities	 ﾠ (Brown	 ﾠ 2007).	 ﾠOne	 ﾠhypothesis	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
people	 ﾠ evaluate	 ﾠ annuities	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ investment	 ﾠ frame	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ focuses	 ﾠ
narrowly	 ﾠon	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠand	 ﾠreturn	 ﾠ(Brown	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2008).	 ﾠLooking	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠframe,	 ﾠconsumers	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcould	 ﾠdie	 ﾠsoon	 ﾠafter	 ﾠ
annuity	 ﾠpurchase	 ﾠand	 ﾠlose	 ﾠall	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠmoney.	 ﾠSome	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠto	 ﾠshift	 ﾠconsumers	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠconsumption	 ﾠframe,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠfocuses	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠthe	 ﾠend	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcan	 ﾠconsume	 ﾠover	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠconsumers	 ﾠ
appreciate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠof	 ﾠannuities.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠgoal	 ﾠhere	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
suggest	 ﾠa	 ﾠview	 ﾠon	 ﾠany	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠto	 ﾠretirement;	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
emphasize	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠframe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠaccessibility.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
VIII.	 ﾠPolitics,	 ﾠPaternalism,	 ﾠand	 ﾠInstitutional	 ﾠDesign	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Policymakers	 ﾠ work,	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ course,	 ﾠ amidst	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ constraints.	 ﾠ No	 ﾠ
nation	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠliteral	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠof	 ﾠPsychological	 ﾠAdvisers,	 ﾠand	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
reason	 ﾠis	 ﾠpolitical:	 ﾠSome	 ﾠcitizens	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠacutely	 ﾠsuspicious	 ﾠof,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ 
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probably	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ alarmed	 ﾠ by,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ very	 ﾠ idea.	 ﾠ Is	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ council	 ﾠ helping	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠto	 ﾠmanipulate	 ﾠits	 ﾠcitizens,	 ﾠby	 ﾠexploiting	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠpsychology	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ steer	 ﾠ them	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ what	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ considers	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ right	 ﾠ direction?	 ﾠ Does	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠhave	 ﾠany	 ﾠbusiness	 ﾠusing	 ﾠpsychology	 ﾠto	 ﾠmanipulate	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠ
(Rebonato	 ﾠ2011)?	 ﾠIn	 ﾠsome	 ﾠnations,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates,	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠincorporate	 ﾠpsychology	 ﾠand	 ﾠbehavioral	 ﾠeconomics	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠ
been	 ﾠcontroversial,	 ﾠand	 ﾠtriggered	 ﾠadverse	 ﾠ political	 ﾠreactions,	 ﾠin	 ﾠ part	 ﾠ
because	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfear	 ﾠof	 ﾠmanipulation	 ﾠon	 ﾠgovernment’s	 ﾠpart	 ﾠ (Sunstein	 ﾠ
2013a).	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ many	 ﾠ nations,	 ﾠ active	 ﾠ discussions	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ underway	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ
whether	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthreatening	 ﾠto	 ﾠliberty	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
self-ﾭ‐government.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
A. Campaigns	 ﾠand	 ﾠGovernance	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ make	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ distinction	 ﾠ here.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ campaigns,	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
course,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkey	 ﾠgoal	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠconvince	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠto	 ﾠvote	 ﾠfor	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠcandidate,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠon	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcount,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠpsychology	 ﾠis	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐established,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠleast	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
part	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ get-ﾭ‐out-ﾭ‐the-ﾭ‐vote-ﾭ‐strategies	 ﾠ (Nickerson	 ﾠ &	 ﾠ Rogers	 ﾠ 2010).	 ﾠ We	 ﾠ
know,	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ example,	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ people	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ asked	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ describe	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ
implementation	 ﾠintentions	 ﾠ(their	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠplans	 ﾠto	 ﾠexecute	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠgoals),	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ likely	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ act	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ planned;	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ people’s	 ﾠ identity	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
triggered	 ﾠ (for	 ﾠ example,	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ voters),	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ likely	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ act	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
accordance	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ identity	 ﾠ (Nickerson	 ﾠ &	 ﾠ Rogers	 ﾠ 2010).	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ
campaigns,	 ﾠmost	 ﾠobservers	 ﾠagree	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠlegitimate	 ﾠto	 ﾠtry	 ﾠto	 ﾠpersuade	 ﾠ
people,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠdate,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠpsychological	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠhas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcreated	 ﾠ
serious	 ﾠ negative	 ﾠ reactions.	 ﾠ Modern	 ﾠcampaigns	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠdo	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
kind	 ﾠof	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠof	 ﾠPsychological	 ﾠAdvisers,	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠits	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠ
include	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwith	 ﾠpsychological	 ﾠtraining,	 ﾠand	 ﾠany	 ﾠcandidate	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
well-ﾭ‐advised	 ﾠto	 ﾠenlist	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠpsychologists	 ﾠknow.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠactual	 ﾠgoverning,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠpsychology	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
controversial,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ public	 ﾠ reaction	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ sometimes	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ
skeptical.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠKingdom,	 ﾠand	 ﾠGermany,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
example,	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcritics	 ﾠhave	 ﾠseen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠpsychology	 ﾠand	 ﾠbehavioral	 ﾠ
science,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ idea	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ “nudging,”	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ objectionable	 ﾠ interference	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠ freedom	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ dignity,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ showing	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ kind	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ disrespect	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
citizens.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
B. Problems,	 ﾠNot	 ﾠTheories	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
One	 ﾠ lesson	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ policymakers	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ generally	 ﾠ best	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ
psychologically	 ﾠinformed	 ﾠapproaches	 ﾠare	 ﾠproblem-ﾭ‐driven	 ﾠand	 ﾠconcrete,	 ﾠ
rather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠtheory-ﾭ‐driven	 ﾠand	 ﾠabstract.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠother	 ﾠwords,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠpreferable	 ﾠ 
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begin	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ high-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠ theory	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ identifiable	 ﾠ problems	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ
obesity,	 ﾠ poverty,	 ﾠ consumer	 ﾠ protection,	 ﾠ crime,	 ﾠ pollution	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
consider	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠtools	 ﾠmight	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠto	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠSocial	 ﾠscientists,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
academics	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgenerally,	 ﾠoften	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠand	 ﾠtesting	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠtheories,	 ﾠand	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneration	 ﾠof	 ﾠinteresting	 ﾠand	 ﾠoriginal	 ﾠideas.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
government,	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ approach	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ (to	 ﾠ say	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ least)	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ ideal.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ
probability,	 ﾠa	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠof	 ﾠPsychological	 ﾠAdvisers	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthat	 ﾠorientation	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ promptly	 ﾠ disbanded.	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ far	 ﾠ better	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ focus	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ current	 ﾠ
policies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠhurting	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhelping	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠhow	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠimproved	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠor	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠstill	 ﾠto	 ﾠidentify	 ﾠserious	 ﾠ
problems	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcitizens	 ﾠare	 ﾠnow	 ﾠfacing,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthose	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠbe	 ﾠaddressed.	 ﾠ
If	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ context	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ difficult	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ navigate,	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ reform	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ increases	 ﾠ
navigability	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ good	 ﾠ idea	 ﾠ (Norman	 ﾠ 2013).	 ﾠ Increased	 ﾠ
navigability,	 ﾠand	 ﾠdecreased	 ﾠconfusion,	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcontroversial.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
nation	 ﾠ faces	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ problem	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ low	 ﾠ participation	 ﾠ rates	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ pension	 ﾠ plans,	 ﾠ
automatic	 ﾠ enrollment	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ potential	 ﾠ solution,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ does	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ much	 ﾠ
matter	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠpsychology	 ﾠlies	 ﾠbehind	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolicy.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠis	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ low	 ﾠ take-ﾭ‐up,	 ﾠ simplification	 ﾠ ought	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ especially	 ﾠ troubling	 ﾠ
(Letzler	 ﾠ&	 ﾠTasoff	 ﾠ2013).	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgoal	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠpoor	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠto	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠ
self-ﾭ‐sufficient,	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ focus	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ cognitive	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ bandwidth	 ﾠ limits,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
adverse	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠof	 ﾠprograms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠstrain	 ﾠthose	 ﾠlimits,	 ﾠmight	 ﾠmove	 ﾠpolicy`	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠ better	 ﾠ directions	 ﾠ (Mullainathan	 ﾠ &	 ﾠ Shafir	 ﾠ 2013).	 ﾠ With	 ﾠ respect	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
healthy	 ﾠdiets,	 ﾠa	 ﾠdisclosure	 ﾠrequirement	 ﾠthat	 ﾠinforms	 ﾠconsumers	 ﾠis	 ﾠfar	 ﾠ
better	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ confuses	 ﾠ them,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ fact	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ psychological	 ﾠ
research	 ﾠ helps	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ explain	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ clarify	 ﾠ consumer	 ﾠ reactions	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
problem.	 ﾠ(A	 ﾠqualification	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthose	 ﾠnations	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsome	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
“nudge	 ﾠ unit,”	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ behavioral	 ﾠ insight	 ﾠ team,	 ﾠ do	 ﾠ begin	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ people	 ﾠ who	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠpsychological	 ﾠor	 ﾠbehavioral	 ﾠtraining,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwho	 ﾠare	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠbring	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠtraining	 ﾠto	 ﾠbear.)	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠimportant,	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠany	 ﾠuses	 ﾠof	 ﾠpsychology	 ﾠ–	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
example,	 ﾠto	 ﾠinform	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrules	 ﾠor	 ﾠdisclosure	 ﾠrequirements	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
open	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ transparent	 ﾠ rather	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ covert	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ hidden.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ democratic	 ﾠ
societies,	 ﾠcitizens	 ﾠare	 ﾠentitled	 ﾠto	 ﾠknow	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠis	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠwhy.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates,	 ﾠuses	 ﾠof	 ﾠbehavioral	 ﾠscience	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ
open	 ﾠand	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠscrutiny,	 ﾠusually	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠobtaining	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠcomment	 ﾠ(Sunstein	 ﾠ2013a).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
C.	 ﾠPaternalism	 ﾠand	 ﾠPsychology	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠnations,	 ﾠapproaches	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠ
controversial	 ﾠif	 ﾠand	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠpaternalistic	 ﾠ(Rebonato	 ﾠ2012).	 ﾠ 
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(Not	 ﾠ incidentally,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ diverse	 ﾠ reactions	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ paternalistic	 ﾠ approaches,	 ﾠ
across	 ﾠ nations,	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ themselves	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ subject	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ empirical	 ﾠ research,	 ﾠ
including	 ﾠpsychological	 ﾠresearch;	 ﾠsome	 ﾠnations,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠDenmark	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Singapore,	 ﾠappear	 ﾠfar	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcomfortable	 ﾠwith	 ﾠpaternalism	 ﾠthan	 ﾠothers,	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates	 ﾠand	 ﾠGermany.)	 ﾠBut	 ﾠas	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠseen,	 ﾠmany	 ﾠ
psychologically	 ﾠinformed	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠare	 ﾠintended	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠto	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠ
life	 ﾠmore	 ﾠeasily	 ﾠnavigable,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠnothing	 ﾠpaternalistic	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthat.	 ﾠ
Indeed	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠnavigability	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠgoal	 ﾠof	 ﾠmany	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠreforms.	 ﾠ
Consider,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrejection	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconfusing	 ﾠFood	 ﾠPyramid,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
efforts	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ make	 ﾠ regulations	 ﾠ simple	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
emphasize	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ insofar	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ goal	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ increase	 ﾠ navigability,	 ﾠ
paternalism	 ﾠneed	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠway	 ﾠ(Norman	 ﾠ2013).	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ true	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ people,	 ﾠ including	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ present	 ﾠ author,	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ
defended	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“libertarian	 ﾠpaternalism”	 ﾠ(Thaler	 ﾠ&	 ﾠSunstein	 ﾠ2008),	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠ preserve	 ﾠ freedom	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ choice	 ﾠ while	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ steering	 ﾠ people	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
certain	 ﾠ direction.	 ﾠ Examples	 ﾠ include	 ﾠ disclosure	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ information,	 ﾠ
warnings,	 ﾠand	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrules,	 ﾠall	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠallow	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠto	 ﾠgo	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠ
way	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠalso	 ﾠAppendix).	 ﾠA	 ﾠreasonable	 ﾠdebate	 ﾠis	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
respect	 ﾠto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠpaternalism	 ﾠ(Rebonato	 ﾠ2012,	 ﾠSunstein	 ﾠ2013a).	 ﾠ
If	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgoal	 ﾠis	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠto	 ﾠprotect	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠwelfare,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠcredible	 ﾠ
argument	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ coercive	 ﾠ paternalism	 ﾠ (Conly	 ﾠ 2012),	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ libertarian	 ﾠ
paternalism,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcan	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠat	 ﾠlow	 ﾠcost,	 ﾠoften	 ﾠ
has	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠwelfarist	 ﾠjustifications.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Much	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtopic	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠibid.	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdetailed	 ﾠdiscussion).	 ﾠ
There	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ two	 ﾠ central	 ﾠ points	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ favor	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ libertarian	 ﾠ paternalism	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ
distinguished	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠlibertarianism,	 ﾠfull	 ﾠstop.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdecades	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
work	 ﾠof	 ﾠpsychology	 ﾠand	 ﾠbehavioral	 ﾠscience	 ﾠhave	 ﾠshown	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠ
beings	 ﾠ sometimes	 ﾠ err,	 ﾠ reducing	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ own	 ﾠ well-ﾭ‐being	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ process	 ﾠ
(Thaler	 ﾠ &	 ﾠ Sunstein	 ﾠ 2008;	 ﾠ Kahneman,	 ﾠ 2011).	 ﾠ If,	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ example,	 ﾠ people	 ﾠ
suffer	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ “present	 ﾠ bias,”	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ display	 ﾠ unrealistic	 ﾠ optimism	 ﾠ (Sharot	 ﾠ
2011),	 ﾠor	 ﾠprocrastinate,	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠlives	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠimproved	 ﾠor	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠeven	 ﾠ
saved	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ helpful	 ﾠ information,	 ﾠ warnings,	 ﾠ reminders,	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ default	 ﾠ rules.	 ﾠ
Impressed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpsychological	 ﾠfindings,	 ﾠsome	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠhave	 ﾠargued	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
coercive	 ﾠ paternalism	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ground	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ improve	 ﾠ people’s	 ﾠ
welfare	 ﾠand	 ﾠeven	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠautonomy	 ﾠ(Conly	 ﾠ2012,	 ﾠBubb	 ﾠ&	 ﾠPildes	 ﾠ2014).	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠto	 ﾠgo	 ﾠso	 ﾠfar	 ﾠto	 ﾠurge	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfreedom-ﾭ‐preserving	 ﾠ
approaches	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠhelpful.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ second	 ﾠ point	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ form	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ choice	 ﾠ architecture	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
unavoidable	 ﾠ (Thaler	 ﾠ &	 ﾠ Sunstein	 ﾠ 2008;	 ﾠ cf.	 ﾠ Norman	 ﾠ 2013),	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ hence	 ﾠ
both	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠand	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsectors	 ﾠare	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠbe	 ﾠnudging	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠso.	 ﾠThose	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠsector	 ﾠare	 ﾠfrequently	 ﾠ
aware	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ fact,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ whether	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ consciously	 ﾠ invoke	 ﾠ 
 
  34 
psychological	 ﾠresearch,	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠchoices	 ﾠabout	 ﾠorder,	 ﾠcolors,	 ﾠsizes,	 ﾠnoise,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ placement	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ reflect	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ least	 ﾠ implicit	 ﾠ psychological	 ﾠ judgments.	 ﾠ
Any	 ﾠcafeteria	 ﾠhas	 ﾠto	 ﾠdisplay	 ﾠitems	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠorder,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠorder	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
affect	 ﾠ choices	 ﾠ (Wansink	 ﾠ 2014).	 ﾠ If	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ government	 ﾠ issues	 ﾠ forms,	 ﾠ
discloses	 ﾠinformation,	 ﾠor	 ﾠmaintains	 ﾠwebsite,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcreating	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠ
architecture,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ thus	 ﾠ influencing	 ﾠ what	 ﾠ people	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ do.	 ﾠ Those	 ﾠ who	 ﾠ
reject	 ﾠlibertarian	 ﾠpaternalism	 ﾠmust	 ﾠgrapple	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
social	 ﾠ influences,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ perhaps	 ﾠ certain	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ paternalism,	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ
inevitably	 ﾠin	 ﾠplace	 ﾠ(ibid.).	 ﾠ
To	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ sure,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ possible	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ government	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ attempt	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
minimize	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ number	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ nudges	 ﾠ (Glaeser	 ﾠ 2006,	 ﾠ Rebonato	 ﾠ 2012).	 ﾠ
Should	 ﾠ it?	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ answer	 ﾠ ought	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ depend	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ judgments	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ
welfare	 ﾠor	 ﾠautonomy.	 ﾠAt	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠleast,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠargument	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
welfare	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ often	 ﾠ promoted	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ soft	 ﾠ forms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ paternalism,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
autonomy	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ jeopardized	 ﾠ (Sunstein	 ﾠ 2013a).	 ﾠ To	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ sure,	 ﾠ
manipulation	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ avoided,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ transparency	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ exceedingly	 ﾠ
important.	 ﾠPeople	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdeceived	 ﾠor	 ﾠfooled.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠmake	 ﾠsensible	 ﾠ
evaluations,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠbest	 ﾠto	 ﾠinvestigate	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠinitiatives	 ﾠand	 ﾠdetails,	 ﾠ
rather	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ proclaim	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ abstract	 ﾠ (Conly	 ﾠ 2012).	 ﾠ A	 ﾠ testing	 ﾠ
question:	 ﾠ Of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ psychologically	 ﾠ informed	 ﾠ policies	 ﾠ catalogued	 ﾠ here,	 ﾠ
which,	 ﾠ exactly,	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ objectionable	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ illegitimate	 ﾠ paternalism?	 ﾠ Another	 ﾠ
testing	 ﾠquestion:	 ﾠWho	 ﾠwould	 ﾠprefer	 ﾠa	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpays	 ﾠno	 ﾠattention	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpsychology	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠsupposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbenefit?	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
C.  Institutional	 ﾠDesign	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
There	 ﾠare	 ﾠalso	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠquestions.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠcould	 ﾠimagine	 ﾠa	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠan	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠpsychological	 ﾠfindings	 ﾠis	 ﾠused	 ﾠby	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠ
officials	 ﾠand	 ﾠinstitutions.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
enlisted	 ﾠby	 ﾠthose	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠin	 ﾠenvironmental	 ﾠprotection,	 ﾠin	 ﾠhealth	 ﾠcare,	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠin	 ﾠcombatting	 ﾠinfectious	 ﾠdiseases	 ﾠand	 ﾠobesity.	 ﾠOfficials	 ﾠwith	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐
established	 ﾠ positions	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ like	 ﾠ my	 ﾠ own	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ Administrator	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ White	 ﾠ
House	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠof	 ﾠInformation	 ﾠand	 ﾠRegulatory	 ﾠAffairs,	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ2009	 ﾠto	 ﾠ2012	 ﾠ
–	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠto	 ﾠuse	 ﾠthat	 ﾠresearch,	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠon	 ﾠoccasion.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
officials	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ genuine	 ﾠ authority,	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ able	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ produce	 ﾠ
significant	 ﾠ reforms,	 ﾠ simply	 ﾠ because	 ﾠ they	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ akin	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ mere	 ﾠ
research	 ﾠarm	 ﾠor	 ﾠa	 ﾠthink-ﾭ‐tank,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontrary	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ“line	 ﾠauthority.”	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ essential	 ﾠ pattern	 ﾠ during	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ first	 ﾠ term	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Obama	 ﾠ
Administration.	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠ different	 ﾠ approach	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ create	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ new	 ﾠ institution	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
behavioral	 ﾠinsights	 ﾠteam,	 ﾠa	 ﾠ“nudge	 ﾠunit,”	 ﾠor	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠakin	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠPsychological	 ﾠAdvisers.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠadvantage	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠan	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠ 
 
  35 
would	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠdedicated	 ﾠteam,	 ﾠspecifically	 ﾠdevoted	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠwork.	 ﾠ
If	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ team	 ﾠ could	 ﾠ conduct	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ own	 ﾠ research,	 ﾠ including	 ﾠ randomized	 ﾠ
controlled	 ﾠtrials,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠfindings	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠ fact	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ done	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ United	 ﾠ Kingdom,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ similar	 ﾠ efforts	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ
underway	 ﾠelsewhere).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠteam	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠakin	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠ academic	 ﾠ adjunct,	 ﾠ without	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ability	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ initiate	 ﾠ real	 ﾠ reform.	 ﾠ
Authority	 ﾠgreatly	 ﾠmatters.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdomain,	 ﾠone	 ﾠsize	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfit	 ﾠall,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
different	 ﾠ nations	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ reasonably	 ﾠ make	 ﾠ different	 ﾠ choices.	 ﾠ But	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
noteworthy	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ many	 ﾠ nations	 ﾠ (including	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ United	 ﾠ States)	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ
concluded	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠworthwhile	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠdedicated	 ﾠteam.	 ﾠOf	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
two	 ﾠapproaches	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcomplementary.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
IX.	 ﾠWell	 ﾠBeyond	 ﾠIncentives	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Many	 ﾠofficials	 ﾠare	 ﾠaware	 ﾠthat	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgoal	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠalter	 ﾠbehavior,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
best	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ alter	 ﾠ material	 ﾠ incentives.	 ﾠ When	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ price	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ certain	 ﾠ activity	 ﾠ
increases,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠless	 ﾠof	 ﾠit.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠpsychologists	 ﾠhave	 ﾠshown	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
material	 ﾠincentives	 ﾠto	 ﾠwork,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠattract	 ﾠpeople’s	 ﾠattention,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠthat	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠsensibly,	 ﾠpolicymakers	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠcombine	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
understanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠincentives	 ﾠwith	 ﾠan	 ﾠappreciation	 ﾠof	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠcomplexity	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ choice	 ﾠ architecture.	 ﾠ Sometimes	 ﾠ people’s	 ﾠ responses	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ quite	 ﾠ
different	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwas	 ﾠanticipated	 ﾠ(Loewenstein	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2014b)	 ﾠ–	 ﾠoften	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠdegree,	 ﾠand	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠeven	 ﾠin	 ﾠdirection.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
An	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠhelps	 ﾠto	 ﾠuncover	 ﾠa	 ﾠseries	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
new	 ﾠ tools.	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ shows	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ great	 ﾠ importance	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ increased	 ﾠ
simplification	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(perhaps	 ﾠabove	 ﾠall)	 ﾠnavigability	 ﾠ(cf.	 ﾠNorman	 ﾠ2013).	 ﾠ
There	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠsubstitute	 ﾠfor	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠtesting,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
significant	 ﾠ increase	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ randomized	 ﾠ controlled	 ﾠ trials	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ coming	 ﾠ
decades.	 ﾠ We	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsee	 ﾠnations	 ﾠcreating	 ﾠCouncils	 ﾠof	 ﾠPsychological	 ﾠ
Advisers,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠall	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld,	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠwill	 ﾠenlist	 ﾠpsychological	 ﾠ
findings,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ behavioral	 ﾠ science	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ generally,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ interest	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
achieving	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠgoals.	 ﾠ 
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 ﾠ
Appendix:	 ﾠList	 ﾠof	 ﾠFreedom-ﾭ‐Preserving	 ﾠTools	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠ“Nudges”)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
(1)	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrules	 ﾠ(eg,	 ﾠauto-ﾭ‐enrollment	 ﾠin	 ﾠprograms,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠeducation,	 ﾠhealth,	 ﾠsavings)	 ﾠ
(2)	 ﾠsimplification	 ﾠand	 ﾠeasing	 ﾠof	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠrequirements	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠpart	 ﾠto	 ﾠpromote	 ﾠtake-ﾭ‐up)	 ﾠ
(3)	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠactive	 ﾠchoosing	 ﾠ(requiring	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠan	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠchoice)	 ﾠ
(4)	 ﾠprompted	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠ(people	 ﾠare	 ﾠasked	 ﾠa	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠto	 ﾠanswer)	 ﾠ
(5)	 ﾠsimplified	 ﾠactive	 ﾠchoosing	 ﾠ(where	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠare	 ﾠasked	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠchoose	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
instead	 ﾠto	 ﾠrely	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠrule)	 ﾠ
(6)	 ﾠenhanced	 ﾠor	 ﾠinfluenced	 ﾠactive	 ﾠchoosing	 ﾠ(eg,	 ﾠasking	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠto	 ﾠchoose	 ﾠbut	 ﾠusing	 ﾠorder	 ﾠ
effects	 ﾠor	 ﾠloss	 ﾠaversion	 ﾠto	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠchoices;	 ﾠalternatively,	 ﾠenlisting	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠto	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠpeople)	 ﾠ
(7)	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠcontexts	 ﾠor	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠeasily	 ﾠnavigable,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠpointers	 ﾠand	 ﾠguides	 ﾠ(cf.	 ﾠGPS)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ(8)	 ﾠreminders	 ﾠor	 ﾠ“accessible	 ﾠcounts	 ﾠand	 ﾠaccounts”	 ﾠ(eg,	 ﾠby	 ﾠemail	 ﾠor	 ﾠtext	 ﾠmessage,	 ﾠas	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
overdue	 ﾠbills;	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpersonalized;	 ﾠreminder	 ﾠapps;	 ﾠhealth-ﾭ‐related	 ﾠwristbands,	 ﾠwatches,	 ﾠor	 ﾠapps)	 ﾠ
(9)	 ﾠpriming	 ﾠ(perhaps	 ﾠby	 ﾠemphasizing	 ﾠan	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsituation,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠits	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠpeople’s	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠselves,	 ﾠor	 ﾠan	 ﾠaspect	 ﾠof	 ﾠpeople’s	 ﾠidentity,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠinclination	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠhonest)	 ﾠ
(10)	 ﾠeliciting	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠintentions	 ﾠor	 ﾠcommitments	 ﾠ(“do	 ﾠyou	 ﾠplan	 ﾠto	 ﾠvote?”)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
(11)	 ﾠ anchoring	 ﾠ (starting	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ certain	 ﾠ figures,	 ﾠ eg,	 ﾠ “do	 ﾠ you	 ﾠ want	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ give	 ﾠ $200	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ
charity”?)	 ﾠ
(12)	 ﾠuses	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠ(emphasizing	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠmost	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠdo,	 ﾠeg,	 ﾠ“most	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠplan	 ﾠto	 ﾠvote”	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠ“most	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠpay	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠtaxes	 ﾠon	 ﾠtime”	 ﾠor	 ﾠ“most	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠare	 ﾠeating	 ﾠhealthy	 ﾠthese	 ﾠdays”)	 ﾠ
(13)	 ﾠorder	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠ(what	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠsee	 ﾠ1st	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠwebsite	 ﾠor	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠroom;	 ﾠasking	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠto	 ﾠsign	 ﾠ
forms	 ﾠon	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠpage)	 ﾠ
(14)	 ﾠ enlisting	 ﾠ loss	 ﾠ aversion	 ﾠ (“you	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ lose	 ﾠ $X	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ you	 ﾠ do	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ use	 ﾠ energy	 ﾠ conservation	 ﾠ
techniques,”	 ﾠor	 ﾠalternatively,	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠbit	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠa	 ﾠnudge,	 ﾠa	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠtax,	 ﾠeg	 ﾠ5-ﾭ‐cent	 ﾠtax	 ﾠfor	 ﾠplastic	 ﾠbags)	 ﾠ
(15)	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠin	 ﾠease/convenience	 ﾠ(e.g.,	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠlow-ﾭ‐cost	 ﾠoptions	 ﾠor	 ﾠhealthy	 ﾠ	 ﾠfoods	 ﾠvisible)	 ﾠ
(16)	 ﾠframing	 ﾠ(“90	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠfat-ﾭ‐free”	 ﾠvs.	 ﾠ“10	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠfat”)	 ﾠ(loss	 ﾠframe	 ﾠvs.	 ﾠgain	 ﾠframe)	 ﾠ
(17)	 ﾠdisclosure	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠin	 ﾠcalorie	 ﾠcounts	 ﾠor	 ﾠtraffic	 ﾠlights	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfood)	 ﾠ
(18)	 ﾠwarnings,	 ﾠgraphic	 ﾠor	 ﾠotherwise	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcigarettes;	 ﾠmight	 ﾠcounteract	 ﾠoptimistic	 ﾠbias)	 ﾠ
(19)	 ﾠliteral	 ﾠor	 ﾠfigurative	 ﾠ“speed	 ﾠbumps”	 ﾠor	 ﾠcooling	 ﾠoff	 ﾠperiods	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwaiving	 ﾠrights)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ(20)	 ﾠformal	 ﾠprecommitment	 ﾠstrategies	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠin	 ﾠSave	 ﾠMore	 ﾠTomorrow)	 ﾠ
(21)	 ﾠ automatic	 ﾠ enrollment	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ precommitment	 ﾠ (auto-ﾭ‐enrollment	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Save	 ﾠ More	 ﾠ
Tomorrow)	 ﾠ
(22)	 ﾠvisual	 ﾠeffects,	 ﾠcolors,	 ﾠpicture,	 ﾠsigns,	 ﾠnoises,	 ﾠfonts	 ﾠ(eg,	 ﾠto	 ﾠpromote	 ﾠhighway	 ﾠsafety	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
attention	 ﾠto	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠself,	 ﾠas	 ﾠin	 ﾠ“virtual	 ﾠaging”	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠonline	 ﾠprograms)	 ﾠ
(23)	 ﾠplain	 ﾠlanguage;	 ﾠdecreasing	 ﾠvagueness	 ﾠand	 ﾠambiguity	 ﾠ(“Plate,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠPyramid”)	 ﾠ
(24)	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠto	 ﾠattract	 ﾠor	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠattention,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠdrawing	 ﾠattention	 ﾠto	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠ
product	 ﾠattributes	 ﾠor	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠplacement	 ﾠ(for	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠcafeteria	 ﾠdesign)	 ﾠ
(25)	 ﾠusing	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠsuasion,	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠfun,	 ﾠor	 ﾠtriggering	 ﾠa	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠ
(26)	 ﾠchecklists	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdoctors	 ﾠor	 ﾠadministrators)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ(27)	 ﾠpaperwork	 ﾠreduction	 ﾠ(including	 ﾠprepopulation	 ﾠor	 ﾠelimination	 ﾠof	 ﾠforms)	 ﾠ
(28)	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠcomparative	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠ(to	 ﾠovercome	 ﾠ“comparison	 ﾠfriction”)	 ﾠ 
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(29)	 ﾠinforming	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠof	 ﾠnature	 ﾠand	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠpast	 ﾠchoices	 ﾠ(“midata”)	 ﾠ
(30)	 ﾠjoint	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠseparate	 ﾠevaluation	 ﾠof	 ﾠgoods/people	 ﾠ(might	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠdiscrimination)	 ﾠ
(31)	 ﾠstructuring	 ﾠchoices	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠpointers	 ﾠor	 ﾠeliminating	 ﾠrarely	 ﾠchosen	 ﾠoptions)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 
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